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ABSTRACT 
Department of Defense official communications often require special protections 
to prevent accidental disclosure to unauthorized personnel. A Multilevel High Assurance 
LAN provides a framework for secure electronic communications, and obviates the need 
for multiple single level networks. A high assurance trusted computing base (TCB), 
allows untrusted commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, such as an Internet Message 
Access Protocol (IMAP) server, to run untrusted while access to the file system is 
mediated by the TCB. Control of creation and deletion of hierarchical structured objects, 
such as those in the file system, is based on the ability to write to the directory containing 
the object. For a mail server, this directory structure corresponds to a mailbox hierarchy. 
The mailbox hierarchy must be designed to allow users to read, create, and send mail at 
multiple levels. The purpose of this research is to develop a trusted process that 
automatically creates the mailbox hierarchy for any system user. A Mail File 
Administration Tool for a Multilevel High Assurance LAN allows administrators to 
easily set up !MAP-compatible mailboxes for each. user. The tool assists in the 
management of the file structure and enables account administration for multiple LAN 
users and group accounts at multiple security levels. 
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"The most often used technology on the Internet has been and is likely to 
remain, electronic mail [1]." 
The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on electronic communications for a 
variety of operational and quality of life services. Electronic mail (e-mail) is being relied 
upon to aid workers in performing their jobs more reliably and efficiently. The key to its 
usefulness is its asynchronous nature. The individual to whom the message is being sent 
does not have to be presently available to receive the message. The sender can transmit 
the message, go about his business, and then, some time in the future, receive a reply. 
The Internet-proposed standard Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) was 
developed as the successor to the current standard Post Office Protocol (POP)[l]. IMAP 
allows a user to send, receive, and edit messages from multiple locations and on multiple 
servers. IMAP was designed to permit manipulation of online messages as if they were 
actually stored on the user's machine. This storage scheme enables users to travel and 
have consistent access to the same mail repository. You can send receive and edit mail 
messages from anywhere you have a network connection. IMAP can access multiple 
mailboxes on the same or on different servers. An IMAP client may allow a user to see 
multiple mailboxes at the same time and move messages between them. Overall, the 
functionality ofiMAP surpasses what is available in POP. 
1 
Without question, this is the future of Internet messaging. However, a security 
problem lies in the design of the server's file system. For example, the IMAP server may 
be collecting messages from multiple users. If a co-worker opens a message that contains 
malicious code, it has the potential to disrupt your service. Mandatory and Discretionary 
protection mechanisms need to be implemented on the IMAP server to protect its users 
from one another. 
In a military environment, much of the information exchanged via electronic mail 
is classified. In this situation, the security of the server becomes even more important. 
DoD specifies four operating modes for computers handling classified information [2]. 
They are: 
0 Dedicated Security Mode: A system that handles information at a 
single classification level, and whose users are all cleared for that level 
of data. 
0 System High Security Mode: A system where only need-to-know 
protection is enforced between users. In this mode, all components 
connected to the system are classified at the highest level that 
information is being processed at, and all users are cleared up to the 
highest level. 
0 Multilevel Security Mode: The mode of operation in which two or 
more classification levels are being processed simultaneously and 
users do not share the same clearance levels for the information 
present on the system. 
0 Compartmented Security Mode: The security mode that allows two or 
more types of information compartments, or an information 
compartment and any other type of information on one system. In this 
mode, system access is secured to at least the Top Secret level. Users 
do not necessarily need to be authorized for all types of 
· compartmented information. [3] 
2 
---------------------------------------· ------ l 
The Department of Defense Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC), DoD 5200.28-STD, states that one of its purposes is to: 
"provide DoD components with a metric with which to evaluate the 
degree of trust that can be placed in computer systems for the secure 
processing of classified and other sensitive information" [3]. 
Under these criteria, class B 1 systems require labeled security protection. The 
typical military system running on UNIX or Windows NT does not apply labels. For 
example, Windows NT is a class C2 system that does provide Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) and supports event auditing, but does not support Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) and labels. Systems that are required to enforce MAC policy, and 
labeling for users with assorted security clearances often necessitate proprietary solutions 
that are difficult to maintain and expensive to upgrade. Another solution is required. 
The partial goal of the Naval Postgraduate School Multilevel Secure Local Area 
Network (NPS MLS LAN) project is to develop a LAN that uses commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) based software and systems with usable interfaces [4] [5) [6]. The LAN is 
based on a trusted server TCB to provide a secure multilevel mail-processing 
environment in which untrusted user processes can be securely executed while protecting 
the existing data. Protection includes prevention of unauthorized release, prevention of 
unauthorized modification, and protection from denial of service [7]. 
The first server implemented in the MLS LAN project was the mail server [8]. 
The trusted mail server consists of untrusted mail server instances mediated through a 
3 
high assurance TCB. The high assurance server was defined in earlier work [5] to be a 
commercial product already available on the Evaluated Products List with a Class B3 or 
higher rating based on the TCSEC [3]. The product selected was the Wang Government 
Services XTS-300 (XTS-300). 
In previous research, the IMAP server has already been successfully ported to the 
XTS-300 [8]. The XTS-300 has a TCB that mediates all access to elements in its file 
system. The TCB enforces a hybrid MAC and DAC policy based on the Bell and 
LaPadula and Biba models [9] [10]. The mail spool and mail files stored on the XTS-
300 are protected by the MAC and DAC policies. 
The IMAP server was designed to access mail for single level systems. The MLS 
mail server will have mail files for some users at multiple levels. In order for a user to 
access his mail at multiple levels, something has to be done at the level of the file system. 
The first thing that is needed is a file structure that interfaces with the IMAP standards. 
The file structure contains the user mailboxes at the various secrecy levels. When a new 
user account is created, new mailboxes are needed. The mailboxes should follow the 
security policies of the multilevel file structure of the XTS-300 while enhancing usability 
for the customers by enabling them to be manipulated with regular COTS mail software. 
In research by Eads [8], the only accessible mail stored on the XTS-300 was that 
at the user's current access class. The reason for this is that the IMAP server has a 
"home" mail directory from which it searches for readable mailboxes. The IMAP server 
implemented on the XTS-300 is instantiated per session level at client request. The code 
4 
is designed to find Inbox and other mail folders in a directory with a hard-coded path. 
Eads was able to change the "home" directory based on user session level. For example, 
if a user logs in at the secret level, the IMAP home is at a directory named secret. In 
essence, the IMAP "home" was a deflection directory. The only deflection directories 
visible to the user are those at his current session level. The native mail program on the 
XTS-300 also utilizes deflection directories. In a multilevel system, the MAC and DAC 
policies allow a user to read that are dominated by the current session level. This 
performance is desired at the client., 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this research was to study the XTS-300 multilevel file system 
and determine potential file configurations that allow a user to access read down 
capability from an IMAP mail server running on the XTS-300. The candidate file system 
configuration were implemented and tested. This research was developed into an 
administration tool that allows mail administrators to duplicate the required mailbox 
hierarchy for system users. In the development of this tool, several questions were 
answered. Specifically: 
D What is the best file structure for separating classified mail on a high assurance 
multilevel LAN? 
D What file structures are supported by the XTS-300? 
D How might pointers and/or links be used to support mail folder organization? 
5 
0 What functionality needs to be included in the Mailbox Administration tool? 
0 Could a given file structure inhibit system performance and affect its ability to 
support usability? 
0 Does the administration tool and mail file structure support the administrative 
needs? 
0 Does the tool support a file structure that is not overly complex? 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The Bell and LaPadula [9] and Biba [I 0] models are the basis for the security 
policies enforced by the Wang XTS-300 [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]. The majority of 
material about the XTS-300 comes from the National Security Agency Final Evaluation 
report[11] [12] in which the XTS-300 was rated as a class B3 system under the standards 
ofthe TCSEC [3]. 
The background and implementation materials on the NPS MLS LAN comes 
from student thesis and published articles [4] [5] [6] [8]. 
IMAP was developed by Mark Crispin of the University of Washington. His draft 
RFC [17] provides most of the material on the IMAP protocol. Additional sources 
include a book by David Wood [1] on Internet mail and the RFC's for POP [18] and 
SMTP [19]. 
The paper starts with a background chapter on the two major components of the 
MLS LAN mail server, The XTS-300 system and the IMAP protocol server. At the end 
of this chapter is a background segment on the NPS MLS LAN. Chapter 3 discusses how 
6 
the XTS-300 interacts with the IMAP protocol and weighs in on what file hierarchy 
would be best suited for the server implementation. Then a description of a small 
experiment that was conducted on the file hierarchy followed by a description of the code 
required to make the chosen file hierarchy. Chapter 4 evaluates the tool based on criteria 
from previous MLS LAN research as well as criteria from the TCSEC. In the final 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. WANG XTS-300 
1. System Overview 
A high assurance base for a mail server provides a solution that allows COTS 
software to run safely in a high security environment. The high assurance Trusted 
Computing Base (TCB) is relied upon to enforce the underlying security policies while 
untrusted software runs isolated in a protection domain [5]. The COTS software, in turn, 
provides the ease of use, availability, affordability, selection of tools, and usable 
interfaces that cannot be equaled in proprietary software. This architecture allows users 
to take advantage of features and interfaces of familiar applications while working in a 
multilevel secure environment. The ultimate goal of this design is to provide secure mail 
processing to multiple workstations on a LAN that can fully utilize the protection 
mechanisms of a trusted server. 
A High Assurance Multilevel Mail Server [8] is hosted on the Wang Government 
Services, Incorporated XTS-300 system [14]. The XTS-300, as evaluated by the National 
Security Agency (NSA), has a Class B3 security rating. Requirements for a Class B3 
rating are specified in the TCSEC [3]. The XTS-300's TCB executes the COTS mail 
server in an untrusted domain such that the correctness of the operation of the mail server, 
9 
with respect to security, does not need to be established. In addition the COTS server, 
constrained by the TCB, does not compromise the XTS-300 Class B3 security rating [8]. 
A Class B3 rated system provides a TCB that enforces Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC), and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies. In addition, a Class B3 rated 
TCB provides a trusted path, an auditing and alarm mechanism, and separate 
administrator and operator roles. It also supports the principle of least privilege, meets 
software minimization requirements, provides layering, abstraction, and data hiding, and 
is resistant to penetration [3]. A system developer must base the TCB on a formal 
security model and provide a descriptive top level specification. The NSA team 
published the results of the evaluation in the Final Evaluation Report [12]. 
The XTS-300 system currently is hosted on an Intel Pentium based 
microcomputer processor. The Intel hardware has a protection level mechanism that is 
used in its self protection mechanism. The ring architecture consists of four privilege 
levels (PLO -PL3), with PLO being the most privileged. The STOP TCB uses privilege 
levels provided by the Intel architecture to enforce protection "Ring" mechanisms (Ring 0 
-Ring 3). [12] 
The Pentium has the ability to operate in four different modes; protected mode, 
system management mode, real-address mode, and virtual 8086 mode. The XTS-300 
runs in real address mode at start-up and then switches to protected mode. The XTS-300 
system does not utilize the Virtual 8086 or system management modes. The protected 
mode utilizes all of the protection features of the CPU, which includes its built in 
10 
instructions and protection ring architecture. The ring architecture is used to restrict 
access to segments, pages, and instructions. As seen in Figure 1, a non-TCB process 
makes use of a different ring architecture than a TCB process. A process is ail active 
entity, which causes information to flow or changes a system state. A process may also 
be defmed as a subject that accesses object data. Both trusted and untrusted processes 









Figure 1. Privilege Level Ring Mechanism From Ref. [12]. 
The XTS-300 is broken into two major components: the TCB, and the 
Commodity Application System Services (CASS). The TCB includes the XTS-300 
hardware and the trusted software portion of the STOP 4.2.2 operating system. Wang 
developed STOP 4.2.2 as a multilevel secure operating system. The operating system 
takes advantage of the ring architecture to help enforce its implementation of multilevel 
protection, and to provide self-protection for the TCB. To support all of the security 
11 
-------, 
requirements the TCB and hardware mediate all requests to access data. STOP is broken 
into four components, the Security Kernel, the Trusted Computing Base System Services 
(TSS), the Trusted Software, and CASS. The four STOP components each occupy a 
separate hardware privilege level. [12] 
As seen in Figure 1 the security kernel occupies Ring 0 for both trusted and 
untrusted processes. Ring 0 is the innermost and most privileged domain. A domain is 
an atomic program unit with its own address space. As a result, the security kernel is 
physically protected from other processes. The security kernel implements a variation of 
the reference monitor concept and enforces all Mandatory Access Control (MAC). The 
kernel also provides the basic operating system. When a process requests access to an 
· object, the kernel performs access checks. If the access check passes, the kernel maps the 
object into the process's address space. The kernel provides input output (1/0) services 
and interprocess communication messaging mechanisms. The security kernel is part of 
every process's address space, however it cannot be called directly or modified by any 
process. The kernel can only be invoked via a kernel gate, hardware traps, faults, and 
interrupts. [12] 
The TSS executes in Ring 1 and provides trusted system services for trusted and 
untrusted processes. It creates and loads trusted and untrusted programs into the 
operating system and supports user 1/0. The TSS implements the hierarchical file system 
by converting and interpreting the flat kernel segment structure and it supports user 1/0. 
12 
The TSS software also enforces Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy to file 
system objects and segments. [12] 
Trusted Software executes in the OSS domain at Ring 2. The user invokes trusted 
software by using a secure attention key (SAK). If the terminal is not currently logged in, 
the TCB requests a user to login. If the terminal is logged in, the TCB queries the user 
for a command to execute. When the trusted path is invoked, any currently executing 
software, either trusted or untrusted, no longer has access to the terminal. A process is 
considered trusted because it could violate security policy but is trusted not to. For 
example a trusted command called file system manager (fsm), allows an authorized 
operator or administrator to modify the access attributes of files. Some processes require 
privileges to perform their functions. A privilege is a controlled mechanism whereby a 
process may be authorized to bypass a system security policy in a controlled manner. An 
example of a trusted program privilege is DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS_EXEMPT, 
whereby a process is allowed to bypass DAC policies to modify an object. A complete 
list of privileges understood by STOP 4.4.2 is outlined in Appendix B. Figure 2 shows 










Services Domain TCB System Services (TSS) 
(Ring 1) 
----------------------------------+---------------------1 
Kernel Domain Security Kernel 
--------~~~~-~~-----------------+--------------------1 
COTS 486 PC/AT or P5/PCI Components 
D : Trusted Computing Base 
Figure 2. XTS-300 System Diagram- Trusted Process From Ref. [12]. 
CASS also executes in Ring 2. CASS is outside the TCB and does not involve 
trusted processes. CASS provides a UNIX-like interface for user-written applications. 
The purpose of CASS is to make the multilevel security execution environment 
transparent to software running in the application domain, which is Ring 3. Figure 3 
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Commodity Application System Services 
TCB System Services (TSS) 
Security Kernel 
COTS 486 PC/AT or PS/PCI Components 
D : Trusted Computing Base 
Figure 3. XTS-300 System Diagram- Untrusted Process From Ref. [12]. 
2. TCB Protection Mechanisms 
As stated earlier, the TCB is comprised of the XTS-300 hardware and the trusted 
software portion of the STOP 4.2.2 operating system. The most important services 
provided by the TCB are its protection mechanisms [12]. These mechanisms enforce 
system policy, provide separation of address spaces, protect trusted code, and provide 
accountability for actions taken by subjects. The hardware protection mechanisms are 
established in the Intel hardware privilege architecture and help mediate processes 
accesses to objects .. The software mechanisms concentrate on the enforcement of policy 
and accountability. [12] 
15 
The STOP 4.4.2 operating system uses a hybrid security policy that combines the 
Bell and LaPadula model [9] for security and the Biba model [10] for integrity. The 
hybrid model states that conditions for both models must be met for a subject to be 
granted access to an object. STOP uses the mandatory and discretionary access control 
policies of the model to protect data on the file system. 
The security kernel, through the use of MAC labels, enforces the Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) Policy. Every subject and every object has a MAC label assigned 
to it. A MAC label is a combination of a sensitivity label and an integrity label. A 
sensitivity label includes one of 16 hierarchical sensitivity levels (sl) and from 0 to 64 
non-hierarchical sensitivity categories (sc). An integrity label is comprised of one of 8 
hierarchical integrity levels (il) and from 0 to 16 nonhierarchical integrity categories (ic ). 




16 hierarchical levels : 0-15 
Settsitivity Category 64 -bits 
64 nonhierarchical categories : 0- 63 
Integrity LeJ•el 8-bits 
8 hieratchicallevels : 0-3 User Integtity 
4 OSS Integrity 
5 Operator 
Integrity 
6 (not predefined) 
7 Administrator 
Integrity 
Integrity Category 16-bits 
16 nonhierarchical categories : 0- 7 
Figure 4. STOP 4.4.2 MAC Label Representation After Refs. [II] and [16]. 
A dominance relationship is defined between labels in order to adjudicate subject 
access to objects. Given two MAC labels, the first is considered to "dominate" the second 
if the hierarchical level of the first is greater than or equal to that of the second, and if the 
category set of the first is a superset of the second. This comparison rule holds for both 
sensitivity and integrity labels. For sensitivity labels the subject must dominate the 
object, for integrity labels the object dominates the subject [12]. 
This dominance relationship supports the Bell and LaPadula model [9], and the 
Biba [1 0] model to make a MAC policy enforcement mechanism using four basic MAC 
rules. These rules are: 
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Simple Security Property: A subject may access an object for reading if 
the sensitivity label in the current MAC label of the subject dominates the 
sensitivity of the object. 
Simple Integrity Property: A subject may access an object for reading if 
the integrity label of the object dominates the integrity label in the current 
MAC label of the subject. 
Security *-Property: A subject may access an object for writing if the 
sensitivity label of the object dominates the sensitivity label in the current 
MAC label of the subject. 
Integrity *-Property: A subject may access an object for writing if the 
integrity label in the current MAC label of the subject dominates the 
integrity label of the object. [12] 
Since this is a combined policy, if a subject wants to read an object, both the 
simple security and integrity properties must be met. Likewise, to access an object for 
writing, both the security *- and integrity *-properties must be met. Control of creation 
and deletion of hierarchical structured objects, such as those in the file system, are based 
on the ability to write to the directory containing the object [12]. This important 
distinction will be discussed in the section on the XTS-300 file system. 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy specifies three allowed access modes 
between subjects and objects; read (r), write (w), and execute (x). In a manner similar to 
UNIX, STOP grants access based on a relationship between a named user and a named 
object. Each user has a unique identifier as well as a list of groups with which the user is 
associated. A subject, acting on behalf of the user, has the user and group 
identification(ID) entered into the Active Process Table Entry for the process. STOP 
supports the concept of real and effective user identification. Access checks are done 
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based on the current effective us~r and group identification. In addition, each object has 
an Access Control List (ACL) that contains the following entries: 
Owning user ID of the object, and the allowed access modes of that user. 
For a process, this user ID is interpreted as the effective user ID. 
Owning group ID of the object, and the allowed access modes of that 
group. For a process, this group ID is interpreted as the effective group ID. 
A list of up to seven other users or groups and their allowed access modes. 
Allowed access modes for any other user or group that has not already 
been covered. [12] 
For each ACL entry the access mode bits (r,w,x) are set. If an allowed access bit 
is set for a particular ACL entry, the named user or group is allowed that permission upon 











A process acting on behalf of Bob would have read, write and execute permissions on foo 
(subject to MAC policy). A member of the Student group would have read permissions 
on foo (subject to MAC policy). Every other user wo~ld not be able to access foo. 
3. File System Hierarchy 
The TSS implements a hierarchical file system that is layered on top of the 
security kernel's file system structure. The files are essentially labeled objects that are 
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containers for information. The file structure is hierarchical, meaning that files are stored 
in a "family tree" structure. The files may be one of four types: directories, files, device 
special files, or FIFO's [14]. At the top of the hierarchy, or "family", of each file system 
is a single directory known as the root. The root is the "parent" of the files created below 
it, the "children". An important characteristic of the XTS-300 file system is that the 
parent of an object is always readable at the access class of that object [14]. This implies 
that the root must have at the lowest sensitivity label and the highest integrity label of a 
given hierarchy. 
The root must have the lowest sensitivity label because of the simple security 
property [9]. The root is the parent of all the subdirectories created below it in the 
hierarchy. The parent must be readable from the MAC level of the child subdirectory; 
therefore, any process operating at the sensitivity level of the child must dominate the 
sensitivity label of the parent. Likewise for the simple integrity property [1 0]. Any 
process operating at the integrity level of the child must dominate the integrity label of 
the parent. 
Another important distinction of the file system is that control of creation and 
deletion of hierarchical structured objects is based on the ability to write to the directory 
containing the object [12]. Applying the hybrid security policy with all four MAC 
security policies, the implication is that a child must be created at the same MAC level as 
the parent. Applying the security *-property [9], a process, operating at the sensitivity 
level of a child, may write to the parent directory, if the parent's sensitivity label 
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dominates the child's. Since it was previously stated that the child's sensitivity label must 
dominate the parents, the only way to reconcile the discrepancy is for both parent and 
child to have the same sensitivity label. Likewise for the integrity*- property, a process 
operating at the integrity level of a child must dominate the integrity label of the parent. It 
was previously stated that the parent's integrity label must dominate the child's. In order 
to reconcile the discrepancy both the parent and child must have the same integrity label. 
The hybrid security policy is so strict that, unless another mechanism is available 
to an administrator, only single level objects may be accessed. A single level file system 
does not take advantage of the extendibility and capacity of the hybrid security policy 
model. The hybrid security policy allows subjects to read objects that the subject's 
sensitivity label dominates. In this sense it enables "read down". The hybrid model also 
allows subjects to write to objects that the subject's integrity label dominates. This is the 
ability to "write up". Read down and write up are two characteristics of the file system 
the mailbox hierarchy was designed to take advantage of. 
The XTS-300 gives administrators the ability to provide controlled exemptions to 
the access control rules normally enforced by the TCB to satisfy operational 
requirements. This is accomplished through the use of trusted subjects. Trusted subjects 
use the privileges outlined Appendix B to perform their necessary tasks. In the case of a 
file system, the trusted command fsm allows users with sufficient authorization, or 
administrators, to bypass the security *-property. With this privilege, a trusted process, 
acting on behalf of a subject may write to an object that has a lower sensitivity label. 
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This enables controlled "write down" capability. With this privilege administrators are 
able to create file hierarchies that are multilevel. 
This is important in making the mailbox hierarchy. The mailbox hierarchy resides 
in Ring 1 in the TSS. The mailbox hierarchy is constructed of directories and files. 
Directories make up the parent nodes of the mailbox family tree. Directories may also be 
children of other directories. When a trusted subject is involved, the child directory may 
have a higher sensitivity label than the parent directory. The XTS-300 file system does 
not allow files to have children. Files are always child nodes, and, in the mailbox 
hierarchy, always have the same access class as their parent. For this reason, trusted 
processes are not needed to create, delete, or modify files in the mailbox hierarchy. 
Mailboxes are files. This means that untrusted applications running in the CASS 
environment are allowed to access mailboxes that have the same MAC label as the 
current session for reading, and writing. In a properly designed mailbox hierarchy, 
untrusted applications are also allowed to access mailboxes that are dominated by the 
current session for read only. 
Another notable characteristic of the XTS-300 file system is that the parent node 
"knows" about, or is able to read the file name of all of its children. This applies 
regardless of the MAC label of the child node. The reason for this is that when a file or 
subdirectory is created, its name, segment ID, and file system ID are all stored in the 
directory segment of the parent. These three elements are always readable by the parent 
even though a process operating at the access class of the parent may not access the 
22 
object to read. What this means to the mailbox hierarchy is that root directories always 
know the names of their subdirectories. A process operating at a sensitivity level of 
unclassified may be able to see that the user has a mailbox named "top-secret". The 
unclassified process will not be able to read the directory named "top-secret", but some 
organizational need to know policies may be bypassed. The problem noted here is known 
as the "knowability" problem, and it cannot be solved with any capabilities available in 
the XTS-300 TCB. 
B. INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL (IMAP) 
1. Basic Internet E-mail 
The "basic" mail system is a peered distributed client/server system built around 
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and its extensions. Clients send and receive 
mail by talking to servers, and the servers talk to one another. A client may send a 
message to one server that can deliver it to the recipient or transfer the message to another 
server. In addition to SMTP, four other elements help make up the basic mail system. 
They are the mail user agent (MUA), mail transfer agent (MTA), mail delivery agent 
(MDA), and the mail retrieval agent (MRA). [1] 
The client in the client/server system is the MUA. MUA's are the programs used 
on a workstation to send and receive mail. MUA's used in the MLS LAN project include 
Microsoft Outlook, Netscape Communicator, and Pine. Many other products support 
IMAP and could have also been effectively used as MUA in this project. 
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The server is also called an MT A. An MTA is a collection of programs that 
transfer e-mail from one machine on the Internet to other MTA's. MTA's both send and 
store messages. MTA's utilize another set of programs to deliver messages to local 
mailboxes as well as remote MTA's. These programs are known as MDA's. Different 
MDA's perform different tasks. For example, a MTA would call on one MDA to 
perform delivery to a remote MTA, and call on another MDA to perform local 
delivery.[!] 
If a user's mailbox is not on the same machine as his MUA, the MUA calls on 
another program to retrieve the messages. This program is the MRA. A MRA is really a 
server/client system as both MUA and MTA must cooperate. The MTA provides access 
to the user mailbox while the MRA retrieves the message to be displayed on the MUA. 
Post Office Protocol (POP) and IMAP are examples ofMRA's. Figure 5 is a simplified 
example of the relationship that exists between these elements. 
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Figure 5_. Simplified Internet Mail System After Ref. [1]. 
SMTP [19] is the standard for servers that move mail over the Internet. SMTP 
was designed when most users were directly accessing their mail from mail servers, either 
from a terminal connected to a mainframe, or a UNIX workstation that was designed to 
receive mail. If a MUA cannot reach a receiving MTA in a given amount of time, an 
error message is sent to the sending MUA. In current practice, most mail is accessed 
asynchronously. Users are connected to the Internet only part-time through a telephone 
line. Immediate delivery of messages is not guaranteed, so the design of the mail system 
required extension. Mail needed to be delivered to a MT A that is permanently connected 
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to the Internet and always reachable. Mail is stored on a server and can be queued for 
later delivery to a user's MU A, thus avoiding error messages if a user is offline. [I] 
Now messages written to the server-side mailbox need to be read by a machine 
across the Internet. In addition, users want to access their mail from multiple locations. 
These problems are solved by use of MRA's. An MRA allows "disconnected" users to 
receive and access mail stored on their server from any location across the Internet. 
Multiple servers and multiple mailboxes can be accessed from any terminal connected to 
the Internet. Figure 6 shows how mailboxes are accessed by a MRA. [20] 
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Figure 6. Accessing a Mailbox With aMRA After Ref. [I]. 
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2. IMAP -VS- POP 
The Internet has two MRA protocols: the older and simpler POP and the newer 
and more complex IMAP [1]. POP supports "offline" mail processing where mail is 
stored on a server until a client requests it. It is described by RFC 1939 Post Office 
Protocol- Version 3 [18] and is considered a standard mail protocol. IMAP was 
developed as the successor to POP and it supports both "offline" and "online" processing 
of messages. IMAP is an Internet-proposed standard and is defined in RFC 2026 Internet 
Message Access Protocol- Version 4, Revision 1 (IMAP4rev 1) [17]. 
POP was designed as a temporary storage point until the messages could be 
downloaded to a user's workstation or saved on the user's file space [1]. POP supports 
"offline" mail processing where mail is stored on a server until a client requests it. Once 
the client requests the mail the mail is forwarded and stored on the client machine. Mail 
stored on the server can be left on the server or deleted. All further mail processing takes 
place on the client machine. POP is a simple protocol in that it was designed as a 
download-only protocol. This means it has two options: download and delete, or just 
download. There is no provision for performing any other actions on the mail while it is 
stored on the server. It is also difficult to access messages from multiple locations. Mail 
tends to be scattered as it is stored on the various computers and deleted from the server. 
Even if a user does not delete the mail from the server, changes made to a message in one 
location will not be reflected when the user accesses it on another computer. In addition, 
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a user cannot access multiple mailboxes on a server without having multiple user names 
and passwords. [20] 
IMAP was designed to access and manipulate remote messages as if they were 
local [1]. For this reason IMAP is more complex than POP and has a richer set of 
commands. This also means that client server interaction is more elaborate in IMAP than 
in POP. IMAP can do "offline" processing like POP. In offline mode, mail is stored on 
the server and all processing takes place on the client. IMAP can also perform 
"disconnected" processing whereby messages can be downloaded onto a client and 
edited. Later the user can synchronize the client and server, whereby the message stored 
on the computer replaces the message on the server. An edited message stored on a 
server can also replace a message stored on a client. The strength ofiMAP however, is in 
its "online" processing. The client can then use the various IMAP commands to retrieve, 
store, save, delete, and create mail messages directly on the server. This allows a user to 
interactively access multiple mailboxes from multiple clients [20]. This model 
complements the design of the MLS LAN where thin client machines are connected to a 
server via a LAN. The thin clients activate MUA's that use IMAP4revl to access and 
update mail stores held on a high assurance multilevel server. The server uses a high 
assurance TCB to mediate access control and since all the mail messages are stored on 
the high assurance server, the mail stores are secure. IMAP is able to provide access to 
information stores at multiple levels without compromising information security [8]. 
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3. IMAP Commands 
Similar to POP, IMAP4rev1 defines four separate states from which a client may 
issue commands. These states are: Nonauthenticated State, Authenticated State, Selected 
State, and Logout State. Commands are organized by state in which a command is 
permitted. In some cases, commands are permitted in multiple states. [1] [17] 
The following commands are allowed in any state: 
• CAPABILITY: This command takes no arguments and returns a listing of 
capabilities that a server supports. 
• NOOP: This command takes no arguments and does nothing. The NOOP 
command always succeeds. It is used to periodically poll for new messages or 
status updated during a period of inactivity. 
• LOGOUT: Takes no arguments, and informs the server that the client wishes to 
close the connection. [I] [17] 
Upon initial connection, the system starts in the Nonauthenticated State. IMAP 
will not allow most comm~ds until the client is authenticated. In addition to the 
commands available at any state, the following commands are allowed in the 
Nonauthenticated State: 
• AUTHENTICATE: This command takes as an argument an authentication 
mechanism name. This is a name of a standard authentication mechanism which 
is supplied to the client by the server in response to the CAP ABILITY command. 
If the server supports this mechanism, which it should since it is listed in its 
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capability set, an authentication protocol follows. Upon completion of the 
authentication protocol, the client changes to the authenticated state. If the 
authentication mechanism fails, or is not supported by the server, there is no 
response. The client may try another authentication mechanism. This will 
continue until, as a last resort, the LOGIN command will be used to authenticate 
the client. 
• LOGIN: This command takes as its augments the user name and password of the 
client user. The name and password are passed as plaintext so anyone monitoring 
the network traffic can obtain plaintext passwords. For this reason, the LOGIN 
command is used as a last resort. [1] [17] 
Upon entering the Authenticated State, eleven commands are available to the 
client that allows creation, deletion, and examination of mailboxes. Two of these 
commands enter the client into the Selected State. In addition to the commands available 
in any state, the following commands are available in the authenticated state. 
• SELECT: This command takes a mailbox name as an argument. If the 
mailbox is selectable, the messages in that mailbox can be accessed. Once a 
mailbox is selected, the session is placed in the Select State. 
• EXAMINE: This command takes a mailbox name as an argument. It selects 
the mailbox as with the SELECT command but in a read·only mode. This 
command places the session in the Select State. 
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• CREATE: This command takes a mailbox name as an argument. It creates a 
new mailbox with a specified name. 
• DELETE: This command takes a mailbox name as an argwnent and deletes 
the mailbox with the specified name. 
• RENAME: This command takes an existing mailbox name and a new name 
as argwnents and renames the mailbox. 
• SUBSCRIBE: This command takes a mailbox name as an argwnent and puts 
the name into a list of "subscribed" mailboxes. this list is maintained in a file 
that can be accessed through the LSUB command. 
• UNSUBSCRIBE: This command takes a mailbox name as an argument and 
deletes the name from the "subscribed" list. 
• LIST: This command takes a reference name, and a mailbox name as its 
arguments. IMAP4revl supports wildcards as argwnent input. This 
command returns a subset of available mailboxes based on the input. 
• LSUB: This command takes a reference name, and a mailbox name as its 
argwnents with possible wildcards. This command returns a subset of the list 
of mailboxes on the "subscribed list". 
• STATUS: This command takes a mailbox name and a status data name as an 
argwnent. The indicated status of a mailbox is returned which can include: 
the nwnber of messages, nwnber of recent messages, the next unique 
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identifier(UID) of the mailbox, the UID validity value of a mailbox, and the 
number of messages that do not have the \Seen flag set. 
• APPEND: This command takes the mailbox name, flags, data time string, and 
message literal and appends the message to the end of the named mailbox. [1] 
[17] 
The next state is the Selected State. It is entered with the SELECT or EXAMINE 
command from the Authenticated State. The Selected State gives the client access to 
commands that allow editing of specified messages. Commands from the authenticated 
state are available in addition to the following: 
• CHECK: Takes no arguments and requests any server specific housekeeping 
be performed on the currently selected mailbox. If the server has no 
housekeeping, this command is equivalent to a NOOP. 
• CLOSE: Takes no arguments. This command permanently deletes all 
messages that have the \Deleted flag set and returns to the Authenticated State. 
• EXPUNGE: Takes no arguments. This command permanently deletes from 
the currently selected mailbox all messages that have the \Deleted flag set. 
This command returns a response for each expunged message and remains in 
the Selected State. 
• SEARCH: Takes a (optional) [CHARSET] specification and one or more 
search criteria as arguments. It searches the current mailbox for messages that 
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meet the passed in criteria. 36 search keys are identified for IMAP4rev1 and 
are listed in RFC 2026. [17] 
• FETCH: Takes a message set and message data item names as arguments. It 
retrieves data items associated with a message in the mailbox. 
• STORE- Takes a message set, message data item name, and the value for the 
massage data item as arguments. It changes the current message data item to 
the given value. 
• COPY: Takes a message set and a mailbox name as an argument. It copies the 
specified messages to the end of the mailbox. 
• UID- Takes the command name and command argument as arguments. It 
acts like the argument you pass in (FETCH, COPY, STORE, or SEARCH) 
except a Unique identifier is returned for each. [1] [17] 
C. SERVER IMPLEMENTATION 
The specifications for a High Assurance Multilevel Mail Server are detailed by 
Eads [8]. In essence, a server should implement the standard IMAP. Modifications to 
IMAP should not affect the successful execution of COTS MUA's, and the server must 
provide storage locations for data of various sensitivity levels. 
An IMAP server is a form of MRA. The current version is IMAP4revl. An 
IMAP server has a TCP application daemon that listens for IMAP requests on TCP port 
143. MUA's that wish to connect to a server try to connect to this port. The server 
responds by spawning a new instance of the IMAP server on a new port number and 
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communicates this port number to the client. In the MLS LAN implementation the user 
is pre-authenticated by the XTS-300 so the IMAP server starts in the Authenticated State. 
The IMAP server instance is spawned at the same MAC level as the current session. The 
server then sends a banner greeting to the MUA and awaits further commands. 
In the authenticated state, the untrusted server is running at the level of the current 
session. That is, the process that is operating on behalf of the user, is running at the MAC 
level that the user pre-authenticated with the XTS-300. The untrusted software, which 
includes the IMAP4revl commands, is allowed to access the file system below it through 
the TCB. The TCB enforces its protection mechanisms on the file system. Even though 
untrusted commands are being issued, the security kernel mediates all accesses. In this 
manner, IMAP commands are allowed to operate on the mailboxes which are held in the 
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Figure 7. High Assurance Multilevel LAN for Commercial PC's After Refs. [6] and [16]. 
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III. DEVELOPING AN ADMINISTRATION TOOL 
A. DISCUSSION 
The Internet Message Access Protocol, Version 4revl (IMAP4revl) allows a mail 
client such as Pine, Outlook, or Netscape, to access and manipulate remote message 
stores or "mailboxes". The client, or Mail User Agent (MUA), is loaded onto an 
individual PC to allow a user to send and receive mail. For the NPS MLS LAN, the 
IMAP Protocol server resides on the XTS-300 in the untrusted CASS environment (Ring 
3). The IMAP protocol server, acting as a Mail Retrieval Agent (MRA) can access 
mailboxes on the file system (Ring 1) or the m~l spool (Ring I). 
In this configuration, IMAP4revl, acting as a subject, is able to retrieve objects on 
the XTS-300 that are stored at the access class of the current session. A remote MUA, 
using IMAP, is then able to read, create, modify, and delete these objects directly on the 
XTS-300 file system. The MAC policies of the XTS-300 file system also allow 
IMAP4revl to read objects whose MAC Labels are dominated by the MAC level of the 
current session. The objects on the XTS-300 can be either directories, which contain 
information about other objects, or files which contain data. 
IMAP4revl interprets a path name as a mailbox. For example, 'bob/mbox' is the 
name of a mailbox. The 'bob' portion is a directory, while the 'mbox' is a file. The 'mbox' 
file has a special format that enables mail messages to be appended to it. The mbox 
format is also known as the "Unix format" and a variation of it is used on the NPS IMAP 
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server. On an IMAP server, only mailboxes contain messages. The mailbox name can be 
separated on the XTS-300 file system into directories and files. The directory 'bob' 
cannot store messages, only information about the file 'mbox'. The file 'mbox' contains 
the data fields that make up the e-mail messages for user Bob. 
A directory path denotes a mailbox naming hierarchy through which a user's e-
mail can be organized. A hierarchical relationship exists between mailboxes if the 
mailboxes share a common root. The mailbox names are read left to right with a single 
character denoting separate levels of a hierarchy. For example, 'bob/newsgroup/mbox' 
and 'bob/work/mbox' are the names of two mailboxes that are part of the same mailbox 
hierarchy because they share a common root. Figure 8. shows how this mailbox 






Figure 8. Sample Mailbox Hierarchy View From a Mail User Agent (MUA). 
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The mail folder metaphor is often used to describe a mailbox hierarchy. On the 
XTS-300, a mail folder corresponds to a directory. A mail folder can hold messages as 
well as hold other mail folders. IMAP does not have a structure that can contain both 
messages and other mailboxes. An IMAP mailbox only contains messages. IMAP 
mailboxes are either "selectable" or "not selectable". Only selectable mailboxes can be 
opened to be read. Mailboxes that are not selectable indicate a user does not have the 
permissions to read a named directory or file. Another way IMAP describes its 
mailboxes is the "inferiors" or "no inferiors" attribute. A mailbox that has inferiors is a 
directory, while a mailbox that has no inferiors is either a not selectable directory or a 
file. The IMAP literature normally only refers to mailboxes, but when a mail folder is 
mentioned it corresponds to an IMAP selectable mailbox with inferiors, or an XTS-300 
directory. The difference is that IMAP mailboxes cannot support a nesting effect that 
mail folders can, i.e., a mailbox cannot contain both directories and files. IMAP forces all 
mailboxes that contain messages to have no inferiors. 
IMAP4revl was designed for single level systems. The IMAP server and protocol 
do not support MAC and they are not multilevel "aware". As a result, the configuration 
of the mailbox hierarchy on the XTS-300 file system will determine how well the 
protocol performs in a multilevel environment. 
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B. RESEARCH FOCUS AND APPROACH 
1. Trusted Mail Server Requirements 
Bradley Eads' I999 thesis [8] enumerated I 0 requirements for a trusted mail 
server. These requirements are: 
I. A user operating at a particular MAC level should be able to read all 
mail dominated by that MAC level (subject to DAC constraints). 
2. A user operating at a particular MAC level should only be able to 
append to and send mail at that MAC level. 
3. All mail read at a level should be marked as read at that level 
4. Mail attachments should be supported at the client using COTS client 
mail software. 
5. The server application must be constrained to the untrusted environment 
of the system on which it is operating. 
6. It must provide for three levels of sensitivity and adhere to the TCSEC 
computer security requirements for open security environments. 
7. It must store incoming e-mail messages at different MAC levels as is 
appropriate to their label. 
8. It must allow the user to add information to messages on the server and 
store draft messages on the server to simplify their management. 
9. It must be as unobtrusive to the user as possible. 
I 0. The ability to mark all messages that are read, even if they are at a 
lower access class. [8] 
Eads successfully demonstrated that an IMAP protocol server operating on the 
XTS-300 meets the requirements for 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. This thesis attempts to 
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determine what mailbox hierarchy is best suited to establish requirement number 1, and 
to develop the administration tool to implement this hierarchy on the XTS-300. 
2. Comparing Mailbox Structures 
The mailbox hierarchy utilized by Eads is comprised of the classification label 





The '/usr2/mail' portion of the hierarchy is at the root, therefore it's MAC level 
must be at the lowest sensitivity and highest integrity level of the hierarchy. The major 
advantage of this mailbox hierarchy is that the system administrator only has to create 
four directories on the XTS-300 file system, one at each MAC level corresponding to the 
MAC label alias used in the mailbox name. Once these four directories are created, the 
IMAP server is able to complete the mailbox hierarchy at the appropriate MAC level in 
the hierarchy, one user at a time. This is done by issuing the 'CREATE' command from 
the server, or from a MUA. 
The structure described above is possible because the IMAP server knows the user 
name and knows the home directory. In this case, the IMAP home was hard coded based 
on the current MAC level of the subject and the user name. Once the CREATE 
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command is issued for the mailbox the server checks to determine if the mailbox already 
exists. If the user is logged in at secret, the server instance acting on behalf of Bob knows 
that the correct home is '/usr2/maillsecretlbob' and looks for '/mbox' there. At this point 
the mailbox does not exist, only a portion of the home path: '/user2/mail/secret'. Since 
the mailbox does not exist the server creates it and fills in any directories needed to 
complete the path. Figure 9 shows the mailbox hierarchy after the CREATE command. 
tmclass/ 
slO. il3 
nvx nvx rvllX: 
? / .11 ~,L'\.C Level slO. iB USL .. , mal . DAC Label n'v'X rvilx nvx 
conf/ 
sll. il3 









rwx ·-· ••• 
Figure 9. MAC-label-first Hierarchy After the IMAP CREATE Command. 
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Since neither IMAP nor any MUA's are trusted, each mailbox has to be created 
one at a time, at the level of the current session. However, a server in this configuration 
would allow mailboxes at the appropriate access classes to be created on a per user basis 
as needed. The administrator would only need to create the root MAC Label directories. 
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A major problem exists with this configuration in that it does not allow a read 
down into the lower MAC level mailboxes. IMAP4revl launches its search for 
mailboxes from its "home" directory. The server is able to visit all of the sub-directories 
of the IMAP home looking for mailboxes it is able to read. The default IMAP home is 
the user name directory. With the home set at '/usr2/mail/MAC_label/usemame', the 
server can only return a single level mailbox corresponding to the current MAC level of 
the user. This fails the requirement for the user to be able to read all the mail dominated 
by his current MAC level. Figure 10 shows the view from a MUA when user Bob tries to 
read his mail at secret. 
?===! usr2/111ail 
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Figure 10. MAC-label-first Mailbox Hierarchy With No Read Down. 
To correct this problem and enable the read down capability, the IMAP home 
should be at the root of the mailbox directory for a particular user. The root would be the 
directory with the lowest sensitivity level and highest integrity level that is common to all 
of the user's mailboxes. In the NPS MLS LAN implementation this corresponds to the 
directory '/usr2/mail'. This will allow the server to visit all of the sub-directories of the 
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IMAP home. This modification to the IMAP home enabled the read down capability, and 
in doing so created a separate problem. The problem is that the server now can see all of 
the sub-directories of the home directory, including the sub-directories of other users. 
For example, Bob is logged in at secret, and his home is /usr2/mail. When he checks his 
mail, the IMAP server not only returns: 
'/usr2/mail/secret/bob/mbox', 





'/usr2/mail/ conf/mary', and 
'/usr2/mail/unclass/mary'. 





















Figure 1 I. MAC-Iabel-frrst Hierarchy With Read Down. 
With a common mailbox root, it is possible for Bob to see what mailboxes exist 
for all the users at the secret level and below. This allows Bob to know who has access to 
secret information. This may violate some organizational policies such as "need-to-
know''. If Mary has her DAC policies set correctly, the XTS-300 would prevent Bob 
from reading Mary's maiL However, if Mary does not have her DAC permissions 
configured correctly, it is possible that Bob will be able to read her maiL 
In addition, if Bob has many mailboxes, corresponding to each MAC level he is 
authorized to view. The server will return all of his mailboxes, only a fraction of which 
may be readable at the current session level. From a usability standpoint, the MUA will 
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be cluttered with mailboxes that the user cannot access. This may lead to user 
dissatisfaction. From a runtime standpoint, the server is wasting time looking for and 
returning mailboxes that the user cannot access. 
Another problem with this hierarchy is that the organization is depending on 
IMAP4revl to create mailboxes at each level. IMAP4revl as it is configured sets the 
DAC policies on the mailboxes to be user only, non-sharable. However the IMAP code is 
stored in the untrusted domain and can be changed. This would allow the DAC policies 
to be set by an untrusted process. In addition, not all clients support the DAC commands 
that are supported by IMAP4revl. Using an un-supportive client would mean that Mary 
would not only not know that Bob was reading her mail, but she would not be able to 
correct the problem from her client if she did. Besides having security drawbacks, this 
hierarchy representation can also be disorderly and user un-friendly. Every time a user 
checks his mail, he would see several mailboxes that do not belong to him. 
Another way to solve the read-down problem is to reverse the user name and 





The /usr2/mail/usemame portion of the hierarchy serves as the mail root, therefore 
its MAC level must be at the lowest sensitivity and highest integrity level of the 
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hierarchy. The IMAP home would be this root directory. The IMAP LIST command 
would return only the selectable mailboxes that are subdirectories of the root. For 
example, Bob is logged in at secret and his IMAP home is /usr2/maillbob. He checks his 














Figure 12. User-name-first Hierarchy. 
47 
Not only is the IMAP server able to read down in this configuration, but, by 
applying the DAC mechanism first in the hierarchy, Bob cannot read Mary's mailboxes. 
The directory /usr2/mail is owned by the administrator and readable by everyone in both 
hierarchies. In the MAC-label-first hierarchy, the '/MAC_label' directory is also owned 
by the administrator and readable by everyone. As a result, all of the MAC label 
subdirectories are readable by the server as it searches for a mailbox. It is not until the 
server visits the subdirectory /usr2/mail/MAC _label/mary that a restrictive DAC is placed 
on Bob's ability to traverse the hierarchy. In the user-name-first hierarchy, the IMAP 
home directory is '/username' and it is owned by that user. As a result, DAC is enforced 
at the first node the server visits. 
The major problem with this hierarchy is that it requires an inordinate amount of 
work by a system administrator. Instead of creating four mail directories from which the 
IMAP server would automatically complete the mailbox hierarchy, the administrator 
would have to create the entire mailbox hierarchy for each user. In a small organization, 
creating this user-name-first hierarchy would be feasible using only the trusted 
commands already available on the XTS-300. In a large organization, however, the 
complex task of creating each mailbox at the appropriate MAC level necessitates an 
administrative tool. A mailbox administration tool must be a trusted process that is able 
to create user mailboxes at the requisite levels of the hierarchy with the proper MAC and 
DAC policies. With this tool, a secure multilevel mailbox hierarchy can be created and 
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managed with a negligible amount of hand crafted administration. Specifications for this 
tool are outlined in Appendix C and the source code is in Appendix D. 
Another security problem exists within the XTS-300 file system. A parent 
directory is able to know about all of its sub-directories, regardless of the MAC level of 
the sub-directory. This was demonstrated in the earlier examples for both the MAC-
label-first and user-name-first hierarchies. Even though Bob was logged in at secret, he 
was able to see he had a mailbox at topsecret. Sub-directories must be created at the 
same MAC level as the parent, otherwise the MAC sensitivity and integrity rules would 
be bypassed. In addition, the parent stores the names, segment ID and file system ID of 
its sub-directories when they are created. If a sub-directories' MAC label is upgraded 
through a trusted command, the sub-directory can only be read by a subject whose current 
MAC level dominates its label. The parent is no longer at the same MAC level as the 
sub-directory, but it does, however have a pointer consisting of its name, segment ID and 
file system ID. A person at the MAC level of the parent can see the name of the 
subdirectory but it cannot read it. 
One way around this is to name the mailboxes so that a human reader cannot infer 
the level of the mailbox from the name. A 'topsecret' mailbox for Bob can be called "X" 
so that when she is logged in at 'secret', all she can see is the existence of a mailbox "X" 
that she cannot access. When Mary logs in at 'topsecret' she will be able to see "X" as 
well as the sub-directories of "X" which contain the "human readable" mailbox named 
"topsecret". The problem with this mailbox-naming scheme is that it can become 
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cluttered at the client with extra levels of the hierarchy needed to hide the name of the 
mailbox. Moreover, the user logged in at the lower level can still see that the higher level 
mailbox exists, he just cannot see the "human readable" name. This hierarchy is depicted 








Figure 13. User-name-frrst Hierarchy With Obscured MAC Label. 
IMAP has the functionality to filter out the extraneous levels of the hierarchy. 
Some MUA's such as PINE utilize this functionality, which makes this type of naming 
scheme more user friendly. However, if not knowing the existence of the higher level 
mailboxes is part of the organizational security policy, this scheme is not reliable. The 
mechanism for filtering the mailboxes from the lower level users would exist at the 
untrusted client. 
Another method for filtering the names of the higher level mailboxes from the 
lower level users is being investigated. The mechanism for listing the names of files in 
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the XTS-300 is part of the stat system call. If the operating system code can be modified 
to filter the higher level mailboxes in the trusted computing base, it would provide a 
persistently secure solution to the knowability problem. 
3. Empirical Study 
A small experiment was conducted involving the MAC-label-first, and the user-
name-first mailbox hierarchies in order to: 
1) assess the performance of the of the mailbox hierarchies, 
2) to assist in the specification of the mailbox administration tool, and 
3) to lay the groundwork for future experiments of the IMAP server and mail 
clients. 
The two hierarchies were built and accounts for two users, Bob and Mary, and 
one group named WorkGroup were created. The accounts were created using the XTS-
300 trusted commands ga_edit to create WorkGroup, and ua_edit to create Bob and 
Mary. These commands are only available to a person logged in with administrator 
privileges. The commands provide a menu for creating an account and selecting user 
privileges. Table 1 lists the information provided to the ua _edit command in order to 
create accounts for a user named Bob and a user named Mary. 
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user name Bob Mary 
user number(ID) 23 24 
default group Other WorkGroup 
command processor /bin/sh /bin/sh 
home directory /usr2/bob /usr2/mary 
Downgrade No No 
Upgrade No No 
--
viewing optional when No No 
downgrading 
·--
change user password Yes Yes 
. ·-
Disconnect No No 
·-~·-
kill, ikill Yes Yes 
Run Yes Yes 
-· 
set group No No 
set level, change default level Yes Yes 
Shutdown No No 
unmark printed output No No 
-
multiple logins Yes Yes 
max sensitivity level and .~;at Max Max 
max integrity level and cai il3 icO ic 1 ic2 il3 ic 1 ic2 ic3 
user default sensitivity le\•el Min min 
user default integrity level il3 i13 
Table I. Responses to the Trusted ua_edit Command When Creating an Account. 
Each of the two hierarchies consisted of a user name and MAC label alias 
corresponding to an access class. The user name was either the login name of the user or 
the default group name of a user. The MAC level consisted of a sensitivity level (sl) and 
integrity level (il). The XTS-300 provides a security map database that contains the input 
and output strings for each of the 16 sensitivity levels, 64 sensitivity categories, 8 
integrity levels and 16 integrity categories. An administrator is allowed to edit the input 
names, display names, and aliases in the database through the trusted sm_ edit command. 
The input name is limited to five characters while the display name can be represented by 
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as many as nineteen characters. The input and display names represent a single sensitivity 
level, sensitivity category, integrity level or integrity category. For example, sensitivity 
level 1 can have an input name of 'sll' and a display name of 'confidential'. The 
integrity level 3 can have an input name of 'il3' and a display name of 'trusted'. The 
alias is also limited to five characters but it represents an entire MAC level. For example, 
the MAC level sll (sci) il3 (ic2) can be represented by 'all'. When a user is wants to go 
to the MAC level sll (sci) i13 (ic2), all he has to do is type in 'all' when prompted for 
the sensitivity and integrity level of the session. The sm_edit, security map editor, allows 
the administrator to do the following: 
0 Add an alias for a MAC level. 
Change the input name. 
0 Change the display name. 
0 Change an alias name, or change a MAC level for a particular alias. 
Show a particular the display name or alias. 
0 List all the input names and display names, and aliases. 
The security markings in the security map database are used on all file and 
directory displays performed by the fsm command and all output sent to the printers. 
This database could be useful in the naming of mailboxes by utilizing the aliases or 
display names provided. Further discussion of this topic is provided in Appendix C. 
During the experiment, the pairing of MAC level with sensitivity label name went 
as follows: 'unclass' = (slO,il3) I 'conf = (sll,il3) I 'secret' = (sl2,il3) I 'topsecret' = 
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(sl3,il3). Note that because all the integrity levels were the same, the names of these 
levels reflect only the secrecy classes. 
DAC Permissions read (r), write(w), and execute (x) for each node in both 
hierarchies were specified. Each set of permissions can be set for any of the three types 
of users, the owner ofthe file (u), the members of the group to which the owner belongs 
(g), and all other users ( o ). These permissions are represented as a string of nine 
characters: 
u g 0 
TWX TWX TWX 
The experiment was conducted using standard IMAP4revl commands from the 
IMAP Server instead of from a client. The IMAP RFC 2060 lists a series of commands 
that "should" be run by the client. Each client interprets the RFC 2060 differently, so 
there is no guarantee that one command will work for all clients. By issuing orders in the 
command line from the IMAP server, we are able to see how the mailbox hierarchy 
performs, while ignoring client idiosyncrasies 
The first hierarchy was the one adopted by Eads using the MAC label alias 
followed by the user name in the hierarchy. Mary is a member of WorkGroup and Bob is 
not. The hierarchy is created utilizing the trusted fsm (file system manager) command on 
the XTS-300. The fsm command can be accessed by normal users to manipulate files 
within their session level or by administrator users who have privileges to modify files 
and are trusted to use options that bypass the security policies. The fsm command is 
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menu driven and provides various functions for displaying, modifying, or deleting file 
system objects [16]. In order to create the required hierarchy, the administrator needs to 
be logged in at (min max), il3(ic0-icl5)). This is required since an administrator will be 
creating files and upgrading their MAC labels through a trusted option of the fsm 
command. This option is trusted because it is trusted to bypass the security*- property. 






Then using the fsm command again, the trusted change option was used to 
upgrade the '/conf file to (sll, il3), '/secret' to (sl2, il3), and '/topsecret' to (sl3,il3). 
The upgrade and downgrade·functionality of the fsm command is only available to users 
who are specifically authorized to have this privilege activated when their account is 
being created or to users who are logged in with administrator privilege. It is necessary 
to keep this privilege isolated to only administrators who have a need to manipulate the 
file system as part of their jobs because of the potential for misuse and policy violation. 
The change option also has the capabilities to modify the XTS 300 ACL which is 




up to 7 other users: 
owning group: 







The only files created were the four MAC label files and the WorkGroup mailbox. The 
IMAP server was expected to be able to create the rest of the hierarchy. This was tested 
by issuing the IMAP CREATE command for a mailbox at each session level. The 
completed mailbox hierarchy is shown in Figure 14. Selected IMAP commands were 
then issued against the hierarchy to test the mailbox structure performance against the 
protocol. The results of the test are shown in Table 2. 
1 . , .1 , 1\-lA..C Level s!O. iB llviAP lome~ usr2;mat i DAC Label mx rwx rwx 
1mclass/ confi secret! topsecret/ 
siO. iB sll. iB sl2. iB sB, iB 
1'\\Xrwxrwx nvxrwxnvx f\\'X rwx r>vx n"xnvxnvx 
bob/mbox bob/mbox bob/mbox 
s!O. il3 0 sll, iB sl3, il3 
rwx ------ rwx ------ rwx --- ---
mmy/mbox mmy/mbox mary!mbox 
s!O, iB 0 sll. iB sB. iB 
1'\V'X --- --- nvx ------ n\'X --- ---
W orkGroupimbox W orkGroup/mbox WorkGroupim bo. \VorkGroup/: 
slO. il3 sll. il3 sl3, il3 
rwx nvx --- rwxrwx --- f\\'X f\'\'X --- rwx I>\'X ---
Figure 14. Compete MAC-label-first Hierarchy. 
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CREATE 
Expected results IMAP4revlwill be able to create a mailbox for a user at the MAC level the user is 
logged in at (No write down). 
Actual Results IMAP4revl was able to create a mailbox at the subject's current MAC level. The 
entire hierarchy for a particular MAC level could be created with a single CREATE 




they do not already exist. 
the users mailboxes, all of the user mboxes that the session dominates, the 
mailboxes of all of the group or other users that the session dominates and the 
group or other user mboxes that are readable through MAC DAC permissions. 
The mailboxes for all users and groups that were dominated by the current users 
session were returned. 
Expected results IMAP4revl will set the subscribe bit on the mailbox at the current session level 
only. (No write down) 
Actual Results IMAP4revl created a file named '.mailfile ' at every level. Users were able to 
subscribe to mailboxes that the current session dominated. However when other 
users log into the system they are able to see the '.mailfile'. A .mailfile is Not 









Actual Results IMAP4revl was able to copy the contents of one mailbox to another at the same 
MAC level. 
Table 2. Results of Running IMAP Commands Against the Security Label First Hierarchy. 
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-·------------------------------------
The second hierarchy was constructed with the user name first followed by the 
MAC label alias. In this hierarchy, Mary is a member of WorkGroup and Bob is not. 
This is the hierarchy that requires the use of an administration tooL For the previous 
hierarchy only the four MAC level hierarchies were created using the fsm command. 
When creating this hierarchy the fsm command is used to create four mailboxes for each 
user. The resulting hierarchy is shown in Figure 15. Selected IMAP commands were then 
issued against the hierarchy to test the mailbox structure performance against the 
protocoL The results of the test are shown below in Table 3. 
, • , 1\f.A.C Level slO. iB 
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the user mailboxes, all of the user mboxes that the session dominates, and the 
mboxes of all of the group or other user mailboxes that are readable through MAC 
DAC permissions. 
A particular user mailbox that was dominated by the current user session was 
returned as well as the mailboxes that were owned by the group. 
IMAP4revl will set the subscribe bit on the mailbox at the current session level 
only. (No write down) 
IMAP4revl created a file named '.mailfile' in the home directory. Users were able 
to subscribe to mailboxes that the current session dominated. A .mailfile is created 
IMAP4revl was able to copy the contents of one mailbox to another at the same 
MAC level. 
Table 3. Results of Running IMAP Commands Against the User-name-first Hierarchy. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Based on the experiment a clear preference for the design of the mailbox 
hierarchy was established. The user-name-first hierarchy was chosen because it does 
not allow users to select each other's mailboxes, it is represented in a cleaner, more 
logical fashion by the client system, and most importantly it enables a read down 
capability. By selecting this hierarchy, a greater burden is placed on the 
administrator to create all the required mailboxes for each user. This burden can be 
reduced by designing a trusted process to create the mailboxes automatically. 
Appendix C explains the steps in designing the process and gives specifications for 
the mailtool code. 
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IV. TOOL EVALUATION 
A. PROCEDURE 
A prototype mailbox creation application named mailtool was produced and 
tested as a trusted command. Among other things, trusted commands allow a user to 
manipulate the MAC and DAC attributes for the current session, and to create, attach, and 
destroy process families at different MAC labels. To execute the command, the user must 
possess the appropriate capabilities. However, users of a trusted command may be able 
to use the tool, intentionally or unintentionally, to subvert other security processes [12]. 
All violations of MAC and DAC policy must be justified and kept to a minimum. 
Privileges may not be held longer than necessary. Each instance of a privilege must be 
verified to be necessary, and tested for errors that may cause damage. 
To test the mailtool, two accounts were created, as before, and a mailbox 
hierarchy was created for each individual. The mailtool is an interactive tool that queries 
the administrator for inputs. At each input point the tool was tested to see if improper 
inputs would result in the tool proceeding to an unexpected state. Each request was tested 
to see if proper inputs were accepted and that the proper inputs had the expected results. 
The main function of the mail file administration tool is to allow administrators to easily 
create mailboxes for users. The e-mail administrator should be able to set up the 
mailboxes for each user and not contend with the underlying mail file structure. Several 
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criteria were used in testing the tool for accuracy, integrity and usability. These criteria 
include: 
• Does the mail tool set proper DAC attributes on the mailbox hierarchy? 
• Does the mail tool set the proper MAC attributes on the mailbox hierarchy? 
• Does the mail tool properly constrain the MAC levels available for each user 
mailbox? 
• Are clients able to access the mailboxes with the IMAP commands? 
• Does the IMAP4revl server interpret the mailbox hierarchy appropriately? To 
test this, seven of the ten requirements for a trusted mail server listed in Chapter 3 
as specified by Eads [8] were used. These criteria were selected because each 
requirement is a consequence of server and mailbox interaction. Specifically it is a 
representation of how the IMAP protocol functions within the TCB. These 
requirements are: 
1. A user operating at a particular MAC level should be able to read all mail 
dominated by that MAC level (subject to DAC constraints). 
2. A user operating at a particular MAC level should only be able to append to 
and send mail at that MAC level. 
3. All mail read at a level should be marked as read at that level 
4. It must provide for three levels of security and adhere to the TCSEC computer 
security requirements for open security environments. 
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5. It must store incoming e-mail messages at different MAC levels as is 
appropriate to their label. 
6. It must allow the user to add information to messages on the server and store 
draft messages on the server to simplify their management. 
7. It must allow a user to mark all messages that are read, even if they are at a 
lower access class. [8] 
• Does the mail tool code support a mail file architecture that is not overly 
complex? 
B. FINDINGS 
The mail tool essentially makes directories and files based on Administrator input. 
The input response to each query must be tested for proper type checking 
? Does the mail tool set proper DAC attributes on the mailbox hierarchy? 
.,/ YES. The first directory that the tool is allowed to make is the user name 
directory. The user name directory is created in the home mail directory that is 
represented by the string '/usr2/mail'. This directory is owned by an administrator 
with the DAC label rwx for owner, group and other. The user name directory is 
created with the effective and real user ID and user login name taken from the 
'etc/passwd' file. The user login name is concatenated with the '/usr2/mail' 
directory string to produce a string '//usr2/mail/usemame'. The DAC 
permissions for the user name directory are pre-defined as rwx for owner. The 
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user name directory string is passed in the TCB gate call create_directory, and a 
user name directory is created with the proper permissions. Error checking occurs 
in the TCB gate call. All subsequent calls to create_ directory are called with the 
same DAC permissions. 
? Does the mail tool set the proper MAC attributes on the mailbox hierarchy? 
.,/ YES. The MAC level directory is created in user name directory. The MAC label 
for the MAC level is retrieved from the alias database and concatenated to the 
user name directory to form the string '/usr2/mail/usemame/MAC label'. The 
MAC level of the mail directory and user name directory is slO, il3. This 
represents the lowest sensitivity level and highest integrity level of the hierarchy. 
When the MAC level directory is created, it has the same MAC label as the parent 
directory. This directory is then upgraded to the desired MAC level through the 
TCB gate call set_fd_access. The TCB call takes a file descriptor and the desired 
MAC access class and sets the MAC level of the directory. Error checking takes 
place in the TCB gate call. 
? Does the mail tool properly constrain the MAC levels available for each user 
mailbox? 
X NO. This functionality is still being implemented 
? Are clients able to access the mailboxes with the IMAP commands?? 
.,/ YES. Clients are able to receive and edit mail in their mailbox hierarchy. 
? Does the mailbox hierarchy perform as expected with IMAP4revl? 
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1. A user operating at a particular MAC level should be able to read all mail 
dominated by that MAC level (subject to DAC constraints) . 
.,/ YES. A user is able to access all of the mailboxes that the current session 
dominates. 
2. A user operating at a particular MAC level should only be able to append to 
and send mail at that MAC level. 
.,/ YES. Current MLS LAN configuration prevents sending mail to users 
operating on remote high assurance servers, but the system does allow mail to 
be appended and sent to other users on the same local server. 
3. All mail read at a level should be marked as read at that level 
.,/ YES. All mail in read within the current session MAC level is marked as read. 
4. It must provide for three levels of sensitivity and adhere to the TCSEC 
computer security requirements for open security environments . 
.,/ YES. The XTS-300 supports 16 sensitivity levels plus 64 sensitivity 
compartments. Users are able to receive mail at all of these levels. 
5. It must store incoming e-mail messages at different MAC levels as is 
appropriate to their label. 
.,/ YES. Incoming mail is stored on the spool and written into the appropriate 
location on the mailbox hierarchy. 
6. It must allow the user to add information to messages on the server and store 
draft messages on the server to simplify their management. 
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.! YES. Users are allowed to edit messages at the current session level and store 
them on the server. 
7. The ability to mark all messages that are read, even if they are at a lower 
access class. 
X NO. This functionality does not exist. A trusted process would have to be 
·spawned each time a message is read. The process would require with the 
SIMPLE_ SECURITY exempt privilege. Each instance of this process would 
trigger an auditable event. Allowing this process would possibly open up a 
window for a Trojan Horse program as high access classes would be able to write 
information to lower access classes. 
? Does the mail tool code support a mail file architecture that is not overly 
complex? 
.! YES. The mail tool is a trusted command that allows an administrator to create a 
mailbox hierarchy for an authorized user. The Secure Server invokes the mail tool 
program to process this command. The program executes at the minimum 
sensitivity and administrator integrity level MAC Level (slO, il3(ic0, ic2, ic3, ic4, 
ic5, ic6, ic7, ic8, ic9, iclO, icll, icl2, ic13, icl4, ic15)). This ensures only users 
with administrator privilege may run the tool. If the program were allowed to 
execute at lower MAC levels, users and operators would be able to access execute 
the trusted process. This would violate the separation of privilege principle. The 
program has the following privileges: 
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• SIMPLE_INTEGRITY_EXEMPT: Allows the mail tool to bypass the simple 
integrity policy, i.e., it can read objects at an integrity label dominated by the 
mail tool integrity label. The mail tool is run at the administrator level, which 
has the highest integrity possible. The mail tool is required to read the 
'/etc/passwd' file which is at integrity level3 (il3). The '/etc/passwd' file is a 
database of user information that is normally used in the CASS environment. 
The '/etc/passwd' file has seven fields, two of which are read by the mail tool 
Get_User_ID function. These fields are the user login name and the user ID. 
User ID and User names are required to make mailboxes for the appropriate 
user with the appropriate DAC privileges. The privilege is activated before 
the Get_User_ID call and is disabled immediately after the user name and ID 
are returned. 
• SET_OWNER_GROUP: This allows the mail tool to set the real and effective 
owner of the mail tool process to that of the user whose mailboxes are being 
created. Essentially the mail tool will be running as that user. This privilege 
enables the tool to create directories and files as the user, thus automatically 
setting the DAC policies for the files as they are made. This privilege is 
called before the TCB gate call to set_user_group and disabled after the real 
and effective process user ID is changed. 
• UPGRADE_LEVEL: Allows the mail tool to upgrade the MAC label on a 
directory structure. This privilege is required to create the multilevel mailbox 
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hierarchy that is desired. All files and directories are initially created with the 
MAC label of the root. After the directory has been created the MAC label is 
upgraded. A directory with a higher MAC label is required so that incoming 
and outgoing mail at higher classification levels can be created, stored, and 
edited at the proper level. This privilege is activated just before the mail tool 
Make_MAC_Directory procedure is called, and the original privileges are 
restored immediately after the call. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
Electronic mail provides a convenient medium through which DoD personnel can 
perform various job functions efficiently. From memorandums to graphics, sound and 
video attachments, e-mail can transport a variety of electronic information. Electronic 
mail is even more versatile with the implementation of the IMAP protocol. Users can 
access their message stores from virtually anywhere. With increased accessibility comes 
an additional threat of information compromise through eavesdropping, viruses, and 
Trojan Horses. 
A COTS mail server hosted on a high assurance TCB helps resolve some of these 
threats. The security kernel mediates all accesses to information stored on the server. 
MAC and DAC controls are placed on every attempt to access information. This creates 
a high assurance environment that is resistant to penetration and able to isolate breaches 
of security through hardware and software protection mechanisms. 
Administration of the high assurance server is tedious due to the constraints 
placed on the file system. When setting up a mail hierarchy, for example, mailboxes need 
to pre-exist for each user at each classification level authorized for that user. To make 
these mailboxes the administrator needs to create directory structures and change their 
MAC and DAC levels to match the desired mail hierarchy. The trusted process developed 
in this thesis automatically creates the mailbox hierarchy for any system user. The 
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mailtool allows administrators to easily set up mailboxes for each user in any MAC 
Level that the user is authorized to access. The tool assists in the management of XTS-
300 file structure and enables account administration for multiple LAN users at multiple 
security levels. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the Group mailboxes have been created with the fsm command, and are 
accessible by members of the group, the mail tool does not automatically create them as it 
does individual accounts. Increased functionality needs to go into the tool to 
automatically create the group mailboxes. Two portions of the code need to be modified 
to make this possible. The first modification is to the TCB gate call to set_user_group. 
This call allows the calling process to set the owning group of the object. Currently only 
the owning user is being passed into this function and the owning group is left 
unchanged. The tool would need to get the desired owning group from a list of groups 
and then create the group-shared directory. This directory would have the group listed in 
its ACL. Next the process would have to change the DAC label to allow rwx to the 
owning group. After this is done, the object created will be able to be accessed by any 
member ofthe group. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Two specific problems need to be addressed to make the mailbox hierarchy more 
user friendly. The first problem was addressed earlier and has not been solved. A desired 
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function in this mail server implementation is the ability to mark all messages that are 
read, even if they are at a lower access. Allowing this process would possibly open up a 
window for a Trojan Horse program because high access classes would be able to write 
information to lower access classes. A trusted process would need to be implemented that 
interacts with the XTS-300 file system and IMAP. The main purpose for this type of 
function is for user friendliness. If a user reads all of his mail in a session labeled secret, 
he should not have to go back in at unclassified to delete all of the mail he just read. 
Another problem is security policy related and it has to do with how the file 
system is presented to the user. Control of creation and deletion of hierarchical structured 
objects, such as those in the file system, are based on the ability to write to the directory 
containing the object. This means that a subdirectory is created at the same MAC level 
as the root directory. The root directory retains the file information (name, Segment ID, 
FS ID) for the subdirectories even if they are later upgraded [12]. This enables a user at 
the root level to be able to see all of the information for all of the subdirectories. In the 
context of the mail hierarchy, this means that a person logged in at unclass will be able to 
see that he has a mailbox at the secret level. The secret mailbox will not be accessible. If 
the person tries to read or select the secret mailbox, the security kernel will send a fault 
message that the file or directory does not exist. The file does, however, exist, and 
because the file name is stored at the root level, anyone with access to the root can see 
that it exists. 
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This may be a security violation depending on the organizational security policy. 
It is not a violation of TCSEC criteria for class B3 systems, therefore this XTS-330 file 
system implementation will likely remain. There is however a possibility that the 
"existence" of higher level subdirectories can be hidden by modifying the OSS domain 
library stat system call. The stat system call obtains information about a file system 
object. The specifications for the stat system call state that rwx permissions are not 
required for a named file to return all of the information on that file [ 15]. However the 
code may be able to be modifies so that a filter is used before information on a named file 
is returned. The filter should return only file information on objects that are dominated 
by the current access class of the subject. If the filter works a person whose access class 
is at secret would not be able to see the mailboxes stored at topsecret. 
A problem addressed earlier that has not been solved is the ability to mark all 
messages that are read, even if they are at a lower access. Allowing this process would 
possibly open up a window for a Trojan Horse program because high access classes 
would be able to write information to lower access classes. A trusted process would need 
to be implemented that interacts with the XTS-300 file system and IMAP. The main 
purpose for this type of function is for user friendliness. If a user reads all of his mail in a 
session labeled secret, he should not have to go back in at unclassified to delete all of the 
mail he just read. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY 
Access -An interaction between a subject and an object that results in the flow of 
information from one to the other [21]. 
Access Control- A method oflimiting access to objects to only authorized subjects access 
[21]. 
Access Class- A combination of sensitivity label and integrity label. Also referred to as a 
MAC label [12]. 
Compartment- A class of information that has need-to-know controls beyond those 
normally provided for access to Confidential, Secret or Top Secret information 
[21]. 
Display Name- The human readable name of a particular element of a security or 
integrity label. The XTS-300 has a security map database where the display 
names of all sensitivity levels, sensitivity categories, integrity levels and integrity 
categories are defined. 
Dominate- Given two MAC labels, the first is considered to "dominate" the second if the 
· hierarchical level of the first is greater than or equal to that of the second, and if 
the category set of the first is a superset of the second. This comparison rule 
holds for both sensitivity and integrity labels. To obtain read access the 
sensitivity labels of the subject must dominate the object, for integrity labels the 
object dominates the subject [12]. 
High Assurance- A measure of confidence that the security features and architecture of a 
system accurately mediates and enforces security [21]. With respect to the 
TCSEC, class B2 and above are considered high assurance. 
Human Readable Label- A printable label name associated with exported sensitivity 
labels [21]. 
Integrity Label- Comprised of one of 8 hierarchical integrity levels (il) and from 0 to 16 
nonhierarchical integrity categories (ic) [12]. 
MAC Label- A combination of a sensitivity label and an integrity label [12]. 
MAC Label Alias- A human readable name that describes a MAC Label. This alias is 
used in mailtool to name mailboxes. 
Mailbox- A formatted container that holds e-mail messages [1]. 
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Multilevel security- A class of system containing information with different sensitivities 
that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and 
needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which 
they lack authorization [21]. 
Object- A passive entity that contains information such as a directory or a file [21]. 
Privilege- A protection mechanism that provides a controlled mechanism whereby a 
process operating on behalf of a user can be authorized to bypass the system 
security policy in a selected fashion [12]. 
Sensitivity Label- Comprised of one of 16 hierarchical security levels (sl) and from 0 to 
64 nonhierarchical security categories (ic) [12]. 
Subject- A process, or a program in execution [21]. 
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APPENDIX B. STOP 4.4.2 PRIVILEGES 
This Appendix lists privileges used by the XTS-300 TCB [11] [12]. A privilege 
is a controlled mechanism whereby a process operating on behalf of a user can be 
authorized to bypass the system security policy in a selected fashion [ll]. Each process 
has a maximum set of privileges it may possess at any one time. Only trusted processes 
have privilege because with privilege, a process can bypass specified security policy. 
D MODIFY _PRIVILEGE- Allows a process to modify its maximum 
privilege set. 
D SET_LEVEL- Allows a process to change the MAC label on an 
object. 
0 UPGRADE_ LEVEL- Allows a process to upgrade the MAC label on 
an object. 
0 SET_DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS- Allows a process to change the 
access control list of an object if it is not the owner of the object. 
D SET_ OWNER_ GROUP- Allows a process to change the access 
control list of an object, the other mode bits (i.e., setuid/setgid) of an 
object, or the owning user/group of the object, even if it is not the 
owner of the object. 
D SET_PROCESS_ATTRIBUTES- Allows a process to set its clearance 
label and process family. 
D SET_SUBTYPE_ACCESS- Allows a process to change the current 
subtype of an object. 
0 TERMINAL LOCK- Allows a process to retain control of the 
terminal when a secure attention key is pressed. 
0 DEVICE_CONTROL_EXEMPT- Allows a process to perform 
primitive hardware control function on a device. 
D SIMPLE_ SECURITY_ EXEMPT- Allows a process to bypass the 
simple security property, i.e., it can read objects at a sensitivity label 
that dominated the sensitivity label of the process. 
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0 SECURITY_STAR_PROPERTY_EXEMPT- Allows a process to 
bypass the security *-property, i.e., it can write objects with sensitivity 
labels dominated by the process's sensitivity label. 
0 SIMPLE_ INTEGRITY_ EXEMPT- Allows a process to bypass the 
simple integrity property, i.e., it can read objects at an integrity label 
dominated by the integrity label of the process. 
0 INTEGRITY_STAR_PROPERTY_EXEMPT- Allows a process to 
bypass the integrity *-property, i.e., it can write objects with integrity 
labels that dominated by the process's integrity label. 
D DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS_EXEMPT- Allows a process to bypass 
the discretionary access and subtype policies. 
0 TRUSTED_PARENT_EXEMPT- Allows a process with an integrity 
level below operator to load trusted processes with privileges. When 
the privilege is present at the time of loading, the privilege bits of the 
new process are not zeroed when the creating process is untrusted. It 
is not currently used by stop 4.4.2. [11] 
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APPENDIX C. MAIL TOOL DESIGN 
A. REQUIREMENTS 
In Chapter III the mailbox hierarchies described were created with a root directory 
at the MAC level slO, il3. Subdirectories were initially created at that level and upgraded 
through the fsm command. The ability to use the fsm command to upgrade objects is 
only available to privileged users. Each user has several mailboxes corresponding to the 
various levels of classified information they are allowed to access. The system 
administrator needs a tool to help create mailbox hierarchies for the many users in the 
organization. This Appendix provides the specification for a trusted administration tool 
that will automatically create and upgrade the directories that make up the mailbox 
hierarchy. This tool will greatly reduce administrator workload and errors possible by 
manually using the fsm command. This hierarchy structure allows a user to login, 
receive and send mail at the current session level. The user is also able to "read down" 
the mailbox hierarchy to mailboxes at the lower levels. 
B. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Figure 16, is the conceptual model of the trusted process named mailtool. It 
indicates the major entities in the mailbox structure and the relationships that exist 
between them. The conceptual model is used it help identify interactions between 
entities. These interactions become tasks that are then developed into procedures. A 
procedure is then defined by specifications that are eventually written into a code. 
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Figure 16. Conceptual Model of the Administrator Tool. 




Two of these roles are incorporated as entities into the conceptual model. The first 
entity is the administrator. The administrator is responsible for implementing security 
policies and procedures related to the TCB [14]. Mailtool is a trusted process because it 
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has the ability to change the DAC labels and upgrade the MAC labels of objects, 
therefore it must be used by someone occupying the administrator role. The mail 
administrator is the only user of the mailtool trusted process. 
The mail administrator has as an attribute "Administrator ID", which defines the 
particular person occupying the role and describes what permissions that person is 
allowed to have. An attribute is identified in the conceptual model by placing it in a box 
below the entity. The Administrator ID is used to identify a person, or process acting on 
behalf of a person, to the system. The Administrator ID is used for both MAC and DAC 
access checks by the TCB throughout the mailtool process. 
The administrator is the user of a process called mailtool that builds mailboxes. 
The conceptual model denotes this by placing a function called "mailtoolO" under the 
administrator attributes. The relationship between the administrator and mailbox is the 
"creates" relationship, which is specified by a line connecting the two entities. The 
number '1' and symbol '*' on the line denote a "one-to-many" relationship, meaning the 
administrator may create as many mailboxes as needed. 
The next entity, which is also an XTS 300 role, is the user. A user is not trusted 
and therefore cannot activate, deactivate, or bypass any security features of the system 
[14]. The user has the attributes "User ID" and "User Name". The User ID identifies the 
user to the system. It is used in setting DAC permissions on objects as well as various 
MAC and DAC access checks throughout the mailtool. The User ID is also used to 
match a user with a login name so that the mailboxes can be named properly. The User 
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Name attribute is the login name of the user and it is used in the path name of the 
mailbox. 
A one-to-many relationship exists between the user and the mailbox entity. The 
relationship is an "owns" relationship that specifies a particular user may be the owner of 
as many mailboxes as needed. The User ID is entered into the owner portion of a mailbox 
object ACL. A one-to-many relationship also exists between the user and the group 
entity. The relationship is a "is a member of' relationship that specifies a user may belong 
to as many groups as needed. The actual maximum number of groups is 1023 [14], 
however for practical purposes the one-to-many relationship is used. The group entity 
has attributes "Group ID" and "Group name". These attributes are used by the TCB for 
access control. 
The final entity in the conceptual model is the mailbox. The mailbox has the 
"MAC label", "MAC level", and "DAC label" attributes. The MAC label is a human 
readable string name that is used in the mailbox pathname. The MAC level is a 
combination of the sensitivity and integrity level of the mailbox object, while the DAC 
label is the DAC ACL associated with the mailbox object. The relationships between the 
mailbox and other entities have already been described. 
A task analysis is a narrative review of how the mailtool is to be used. The task 
analysis is conducted to determine what kinds of functions need to be designed within the 
process. The task analysis of the mailtool is as follows. The mail administrator will login 
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and invoke the trusted path. At the prompt, the administrator will invoke the mailtool 
trusted procedure. 
The mailtool will first ask the administrator for the User ID or User Name of the 
person whose mailbox is to be constructed. If the entry of the User ID or User Name is 
valid, the tool will proceed to the next task. If the User ID or User name is not valid, the 
administrator will have to enter either another ID, a name, or exit. 
The tool will then ask the user for the path name of the mail home directory. This 
directory must be known to both the IMAP server and the mailtool. For this reason, a 
default mail home directory is given as a choice. If the Administrator wants to use a 
different home, it can be entered here. 
The mailtool takes the mail home directory and the User name and creates a 
directory '/mailhome/username'. The '/mailhome' directory is at the root of the 
hierarchy so it has the lowest sensitivity level and highest integrity level of the entire 
hierarchy. The '-/username' directory has the lowest sensitivity level and highest 
integrity level available to the user as long as it is not lower/higher than the mailhome. Its 
DAC permission are set to 'rwx --- ---' with the user as the owner. 
The next task is for the administrator to enter a list of MAC levels that is used to 
create mailboxes for a user. This is done by asking the administrator for the sensitivity 
level, including sensitivity categories, and the integrity level, including integrity 
categories. This information is combined into a MAC level that has all four elements. 
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The MAC level represents the level at which the user is authorized to receive mail. The 
list is created one MAC level at a time or by referencing a default list. 
The MAC Levels are then converted into a human readable label that is used to 
create a directory. The human readable MAC label must be standard for every user in the 
organization. For that reason, an alias database is used. This feature is available using a 
mailbox alias database that is used by both mailtool and IMAP. As stated in Chapter III, 
the XTS-300 provides a similar alias database in the security map database. However, 
limitations on the name length of the alias make its use problematic for users. For 
example, each mailbox in our hierarchy occupies its own MAC level. A mailbox at 
sl3(scl), il3 needs to be named differently than the mailbox at ~13,il3. These two 
mailboxes should not be named '/usr2/mail/bob/secret'. 
If the alias capability provided by the security map database is used, this is not a 
problem because each mailbox will have a unique name. The problem would be in 
reading and interpreting the mailbox aliases since each is limited to only five characters. 
The mailbox at sl3, il3 might be named '/usr2/mail/bob/tst for "topsecret trusted" and the 
one at sl3(scl), il3 would be named '/usr2/mail/bob/tsnt for "topsecret NATO trusted". 
This naming scheme would not support easily identifiable mailboxes at multiple MAC 
levels. 
If the security map display name of each sensitivity and integrity level and 
category is utilized, a user would be able to identify exactly the access class of each 
mailbox. All that would have to be done is to concatenate the names of each level and 
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category and separate them by an underscore. Thus sl2,il3 becomes a mailbox 
'/usr2/maillbob/secret_trusted'. The problem then becomes that the mailbox names will 
start to become too long if multiple categories are used. A mailbox at sc2(scl,sc2), 
il3(ic 1) is named '/usr2/maillbob/secret_ nato_ chemical_ trusted_ electronicintel'. This 
name, although descriptive, may become too long for readability and comprehension. 
After the human readable MAC label is obtained from the alias database for a 
particular MAC level, the next task is to create the MAC level directory. The MAC level 
directory is a subdirectory of the user name directory with the pathname 
'/mailhome/usmame/MAC_label'. The MAC level of the 'IMAC_label' directory is then 
upgraded utilizing special permissions to match the desired MAC level. 
After the MAC level directory is created, the 'mbox' file must be created. 
The mbox file used in the NPS MLS LAN is a version of the UNIX mailbox format. 
Essentially an mbox is an XTS-300 file that represents the IMAP mailbox structure. The 
newly created mailbox is represented by the pathname '/mailhome/usemame/ 
MAC _label/mbox'. Each new message to an IMAP mailbox is appended to the mbox file. 
The mbox file is created at the MAC level of the parent directory so its level does not 
have to be modified. After the mbox file is created for each MAC level on the list of 
mailboxes, the tool is finished with its task and exits. This task analysis is represented in 
Table 4. 
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Primary Task: Create MailBox Hierarchy 
Subtask 1: Get_User_ID 
Subtask 2: Get Mail Home 
Subtask 3: Make User Directory 
Subtask 4: Get MAC list 
Subtask 5: Get MAC label 
Subtask 6 : Make MAC Directory 
Subtask 7: Create mbox 
Table 4. Mailtool Primary Task Analysis. 
The Primary task "Create mailbox hierarchy" is encompassed in the file tool.c. 
This is the main program in mailtool. The file tool.c makes calls to procedures in the file 
toolbox.c. These procedures equate to the subtasks in the task analysis. The procedures 
are specified in the next section. 
C. TOOLBOXPROCEDURES 
1. Get_User_ID 
a. External Interface 





The login name of a valid user from the '/ect/passwd' file 
0 id 
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The User ID number from the '/ect/passwd' file 
d. Processing 
This function displays a menu and prompts the Administrator for 
input. The administrator is given a choice to either select a user from a list, 
enter the user name, or exit. If the administrator picks the list option, a list 
of users who have accounts is displayed and the administrator is prompted 
to pick one. If the entry is valid, a name and id is output and integer '1' is 
returned. If the administrator to enters a valid name at the prompt, the 
name and corresponding id is output and an integer '1' is returned. If an 
invalid name or id is input by the administrator the function displays an 
error message and prompts the administrator to select from the menu 
again. The final option for the administrator is exit. If exit is selected 
nothing is output and '-1' is returned. This Procedure uses the standard 
call getpwuid to get the user name from a given id and the standard call 
get_user_number to get a user id from a name [13]. 
e. Exceptions 
If the user name and user id is not valid, the function displays an 
error message and prompts the administrator with the menu of selections. 
If the administrator exits the function, a valid input for user id and user 
name was not received. 
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2. Get_Mail_Home 
a. External Interface 
int Get_Mail_Home(char* home); 
b. Inputs 
0 home 




The string corresponding to the home directory upon which the 
hierarchy will be built. 
d. Processing 
This function checks to see if the default home directory is valid. 
The default home directory is hard coded into the IMAP server. This 
default directory is specified in a file that is accessible to both mailtool 
and the IMAP server. If the default directory is valid then it is passed back 
as output. 
e. Exceptions 
If the default directory is not assessable to mailtool, an integer '-
1' is returned. Otherwise an integer ' 1 '. 
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3. Make_ User _Directory 
a. External Interface 




The character string that corresponds to the mail home directory. 
0 name 
The character string corresponding to the login name of the user 
whose mailboxes are being constructed. 
c. Outputs 
0 directory 
The character string consisting of the mail home directory 
concatenated with a character 'I' and the string corresponding to the 
user name. The output directory string looks like 
'/mailhome/usemame/ 
d. Processing 
This function takes mail home and the user name and makes the 
directory '/mailhome/usemame'. The TCB gate calls create_directory, 
and open_fs are used [13]. 
e. Exceptions 
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If the creation of the directory fails a standard error code from 
standard library error_ code.h is output to the screen and '-1' is returned. 
Otherwise an integer '1' is returned. 
4. Get_MAC_List 
a. External Interface 
MAC_alias_list* Get_MAC_list(const short int id, 
int *num _of_ entries) 
b. Inputs 
D id 
The user id of the mailbox owner. 
c. Outputs 
D num of entries 
The number of list entries. 
D MAC alias list 
- -
A struct comprised of a human readable label and an MAC level. 
d. Processing 
The administrator is prompted with a list of options for entering 
the MAC levels for which mailboxes are going to be placed in the 
hierarchy. The procedure uses a OSS domain library fimction 
request_level to add MAC levels to the MAC_alias_list [13]. It also uses 
the utility call get_hrl_db_label. Once all of the levels and labels have 
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been added to the list, the function exits outputting the list of structs and 
the number of entries on the list. 
e. Exceptions 
If there are invalid entries at any prompt, the function displays an 
error message and prompts the administrator with the menu of selections. 
If the administrator exits the function or there is an error, a null list is 
returned and a num _of_ entries value of 0 is output. 
5. Get_MAC_label 
During the design of this function it was determined that an alias database 
needed to be created so that IMAP and mailtool could reference the mailbox 
names in a hierarchy. This database was created and a utility call 
get_hrl_db_label was defined. The hrl_db.h file is included in the toolbox.c 
file so that this function may be called. The function Get_MAC_label was not 
needed in mailtool. 
6. Make_MAC_Directory 
a. External Interface 
Int Make_ MAC_ Directory( const char* user_ directory, 
const char* label, 




0 user_ directory 
The character string that corresponds to the user directory 
'/mailhome/usernarne'. 
0 label 
The human readable MAC label provided by the hrl_ db. 
0 Mac 
The MAC level that corresponds to the label 
c. Outputs 
0 MAC_ directory 
The directory string that is constructed by concatenating the user 
directory with a character 'I' and the label. 
'/mailhome/username/MAC _label" 
d. Processing 
This function takes the user name directory '/mailhome/usernarne' 
and the MAC label to make the directory 
'/mailhome/usernarne/MAC _label'. The TCB gate calls 
create_ directory, and open_fs [13] are used. After the directory is made 
the TCB gate call get_fd_access and set_fd_access is made to upgrade the 





If the creation of the directory fails, or the directory is not 
assessable for upgrade, a standard error code from standard library 
error_ code.h is output to the screen and an integer '-1' is returned. 
Create_mbox 
a. External Interface 






This function calls an !MAP utility mbxcreat that creates a 'mbox' 
for a user at the current process MAC level. The IMAP utility is aware of 
the mailbox owner and used the level to put the mbox at the appropriate 
place in the pathname. Essentially an mbox is an XTS-300 file that 
represents the IMAP mailbox structure. The newly created mailbox is 
represented by the pathname '/mailhome/username/MAC _label/mbox'. 
e. Exceptions 
If the creation of the directory fails a standard error code from 
standard library error_ code.h is output to the screen and '-1' is returned. 
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APPENDIX D. SOURCE CODE 
This appendix contains the source code for mailtool. The implementations of 
some functions return void instead of int as prescribed by the specification. 
II File: tool.c 
II Author: Richard K. Rossetti 
Sep 2000 II Date: 
II Purpose: Provide a tool to set up a mailbox 
hierarchy for an IMAP server running 
on the WANG XTS-300 platform 
II 
II 
#ifdef OSS OPTION 








#include "IMAP xts.h" 
#include "priv=:util.h" 
int main ( int argc, char **argv ) 
{ 
char user name[NAME LENGTH];//user name 
short int-user id;/7 user ID 
char *mail home= hard code base dir; //mail home 
char user dir name[PATH MAX]; -
char MAC dir name[PATH MAx]; 
MAC alias list *MAC level list; 
access rna-MAC level; -
char MAC label[NAME MAX]; 
error code the err;-
ushort old priv; 
int num_of=:mas; 
printf("*** Welcome to the Mailbox Adminstrator Tool 
//allows program to violate simple integrity 
old_priv = enable_simple_integrity_priv(); 
//gets the name and user id of the mailbox owner 
Get_User_ID(user_name, user_id); 
if( user id != -1) // if UID not valid exit { -
printf("You selected user %2d)",user id); 
printf(" - %8s\n", user_name); -
//sets effective user to user name 
//allows process to run as user name 
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***\n"); 
old priv =enable uid priv(); 
the-err= set user group(user id,NO GROUP CHANGE, 
- - - user_ld,NO_GROUP_CHANGE); 
set_priv(old_priv); 
Get_Mail_Home(mail_home);//gets from a .h file 
//makes the -/<user name> directory 
//with user name as-the owner 
Make User Directory(mail home, user name, 
- - user=dir_name);-
//gets a list of mailboxes to be created 
MAC level list= Get_MAC_list(user_id, &num_of mas); 
//while loop runs through list one at a time 
int ix = 0; 
while(ix != num_of_mas) 
{ 
//allows process to upgrade object 
//MAC levels 
old_priv = enable_upgrade_priv(); 
//makes a single directory for a 
//MAC label and upgrades its 
//MAC level. dir is owned 
//by user name 
Make MAC Directory(user dir name, 
- - MAC Ievei list[ix] .label, 
&MAC level list[ix] .level, 
MAC_dir_name); 
set priv(old_priv); 
//calls IMAP to format make mbox 
Create_mbox(&MAC_level_list[ix) .level}; 
ix++; //increments pointer to get next 
//mailbox on the list 
} //end while 
}//end if 
printf("\n*** Exiting mailtool ***\n"); 
return(O); 
}// end main 
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---------------------------------------------···----···· 
II File: toolbox.c 
II Author: Richard K. Rossetti 
II Date: Sep 2000 
II Purpose: Provide a tool to set up a mailbox 
II hierarchy on the XTS-300 
#ifdef OSS OPTION 
#include <user group.h> 
#include <error code.h> 











#include "hrl db.h" 
ll-----------------------------------------------
1/-- PROCEDURE void Get User ID 
11-- PURPOSE Gets the-username and User ID 
11-- for a mailbox 
11-- Pre Trusted process needs privilege to 
11-- "read down" to lower integrity 
11-- database 
11-- Post User name and User Id initialized 
11-- Exceptions Invalid input from the keyboard 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters char* name, short int &id 
11-- ---------------------------------------------
void Get_User_ID(char* name, short int &id) 
{ 
struct passwd *pw ptr; 
char choice str[lO], *gets res; 
id = 0; - -
//begining menu 
printf("This tool allows you to make mailboxes for a user.\n" 
"You can start by entering the name of the user you \n" 
"wish to make the mailboxes for or select a user from \n" 
"a list of users.\n"); 
while (id == 0) { 
printf("Valid requests are:\n" 
" name (enter the name of the user)\n" 
" list (select user from a list)\n" 
" exit (exit this co:mmand)\n"); 
gets_res gets(choice_str); //get the keyboard entry; 
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if (!strcmp(choice_str,"list"))//if the menu selection is list 
{ 
int first_col = TRUE; 
II itterates through pwd file and prints elements of 
//passwd struct in two collums 
while (pw ptr = getpwent()) { -
print£(" %2d) ", pw ptr->pw uid); 
print£(" %8s", pw_ptr->pw_name); 




















first col = FALSE; 
else 
{ 
printf ( "\n"); 
first col = TRUE; 
}// end If else 
}//end while 
if (! first_col) 
{ 
printf ( "\n"); 
") ; 
//gets the user ID from keyboard 
printf("\nEnter the number of the user" 
"you wish to create a mailbox for: \n"); 
gets res= gets(choice str); 
id - atoi(choice_str);//the number entered from the keyboard; 


























}// end if 
}// end if 
else if(!strcmp(choice_str,"exit"))//if the menu selection is exit 
id = -1; 
//end else 
else //get the name 
{ 
id = get_user_number(choice_str); 






















id = 0; 
} 
}// end else 
if (id == 0) 
{ 




/1-------------END Get User ID------------------------
!1----------------------------------------------------
ll-- PROCEDURE void Get Mail Home 
//-- PURPOSE Get the mail home 
11-- Pre Default mail home defined 
11-- Post mail home directory defined 
11-- Exceptions Invalid input from the keyboard 
11-- string too long 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters char* home 
11-- -------------------------------------------------
void Get_Mail_Home(char* home) 
{ 
char choice str[32], *gets_res; 
short int value = 0; 
printf("The default mail home is %s\n", 
home); 



























void Make User Directory 
makes the-directory /home/username 
mail home defined, user defined 
a directory is created 
directory already exists 
void 
const char* home, const char* name, 
char* directory 
void Make User Directory(const char* home, 
- const char* name, char* directory) 
} 
error code err; 
access da dac ; 
dac.owner_perms ~READ_WRITE_EXECUTE_MODE; 
dac.group perms 0; 
dac.other-perms ~o; 
sprintf(directory, "%s/%s", home, name); 
printf("Making directory %s\n", directory); 
err= create_directory(directory,dac);//maked dir w/ rwx for owner 
if (err != NO_ERROR) 
{ 



















MAC alias list* 
- -
void Get MAC list 
Gets a list of MAC labels and MAC 
label aliases 
user id defined 
A list of MAC labels and alias labels 
Invalid user input 
MAC alias list struct 
short int-id, *num_of_entries 
Get MAC list(short int id, 
- -int *num_of_entries) 
const char* alias[5] {"unclass", "con£", 
"secret", "topsecret",NULL}; 
MAC alias list *list 
int-index;;;;O; 
*num of entries = 0; 
int keep going = 1; 
int yes label = 1; 
int add-to list = 1; 
access ma temp rna; 
char* temp_label; 
NULL;//= malloc(4 *sizeof(MAC_alias list)); 
99 
init_hrl_db_for_update(); 
char choice_str[lO], *gets_res; 
printf("\nYou may create mailboxes from a default list,\n" 
"you may create them individually, or you may create\n" 
"them from a range of MAC levels.\n"); 
while(keep going 1) { -
printf("Valid requests are :\n" 
default (create mailboxes from a default list)\n" 
single (create individual mailboxes)\n" 









(display the mailboxes owned by the user)\n" 
(show the list of mailboxes to be made)\n" 
(make the mailboxes on the list)\n" 
(exit without making any mailboxes)\n"); 
gets_res gets(choice_str); 
if (!strcmp(choice_str,"default"})//if the menu selection is 
default 
{ 
printf("Making the default list\n"); 
while(alias[index] !=NULL) 
{ 
//printf("*** add of level %d\n", 
//(int) &(list[*num_of_entries] .level)); 
if (get hrl db access class(alias[index], 
&temp_ma)==HRL_FOUND) 





list = realloc(list, 
((l+(*num of entries))*sizeof(MAC alias list))); 
- }//end if else - -
memcpy(&list[*num of entries] .level, 
&temp rna, sizeof(access rna)); 
strcpy(list[*num_of_entries] .label, alias[index]); 
printf("***MAC level sl: %d il: %d\n", 











}//end if (default) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"single"))//if the menu selection is 
{ 
request_level("mailbox",&temp_ma,FALSE, TRUE); 
if (get hrl db label(&ternp rna, 
- - -ternp_label)~=HRL_FOUND) 
add to list = 1; 
else 
{ 
display level("\na label has not been defined for ", 
- &ternp_rna); 
yes label = 
- request_yes_no("\nDo you want to define one?\n"); 
if(yes label) { -
display level("enter the mailbox label for 
- &temp ma); 




add to list -1; 
}//end-if-else 
}// end if else 
if(add to list) { - -
printf("found\n"); 
if (list == NULL) 
{ 
list rnalloc(sizeof(MAC_alias list)); 
else 
{ 
list = realloc(list, 
. " , 
((l+(*nurn of entries))*sizeof(MAC alias list))); 
}//end if else - - -
rnerncpy(&list[*nurn of entries] .level, 
&temp rna, sizeof(access rna)); 








printf ("***MAC level sl: %d il: %d\n", 




keep going = 1; 
//end-else if (single) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"range"))//if the menu selection is 
printf("\n Not implemented yet, try again"); 
keep going 1; 
//end else if (range) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"list"))//if the menu selection is 
keep going = 1; 
//end else if (list) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"display"))//if the menu selection is 
printf("\n Not implemented yet, try again\n"); 
keep going 1; 
//end else if (display) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"make"))//if the menu selection is 
printf("\nList is complete "); 
keep going = -1; 
//end else if (make) 
else if (!strcmp(choice_str,"exit"))//if the menu selection is 
printf("\nNo mailboxes will be made\n"); 
list = NULL; 
*num of entries = 0; 
keep-going= -1; 
//end else if (exit) 
else 
{ 
printf("\nERROR Input not valid, try again.\n"); 
keep going = -1; 
//end-else 







int ix 0; 
printf("the current list of mailboxes to be made:\n"); 




keep going= request_yes_no("\nDo you want to edit the list?"); 
//end-if else 
}//end while (keep going) 
return(list); 
/1-------------END Get User MAC level-------------------
11-------------------------------------------------------
ll-- PROCEDURE void Get User MAC label 
11-- PURPOSE Gets the-MAC label that corresponds to 
11-- the MAC level from the security map 
11-- Pre MAC level passed in 
II-- Post An alias label is associated with the 
11-- MAC level 
11-- Exceptions label doesnt exist 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters access_ma level, char* label 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------
void Get_MAC_label(access_ma* level, char* label) 
{ 
} 
init hrl db for_access(); 







printf("ERROR: label not found for this MAC level\n"); 
label = NULL; 
printf("***MAC level sl: %d il: %d\n", 
level->security level, 
level->integrity_level); 












void Make MAC Directory 




directory already exists 
void 
char* user directory, char* label, 
access=ma* mac, char* MAC_directory 
II-- ----------------------------------------------------
void Make MAC Directory(const char* user directory, 
- - const char* label, 
access rna* mac, 
char* MAC_directory) 
printf("***Making MAC label directory\n"); 
error code err; 
access da dac ; 
dac.owner perms =READ_WRITE_EXECUTE_MODE; 
dac.group-perms = 0; 
dac.other-perms =0; 
access access level; 
access level.ma = *mac; 
access rna tempmac; 
int fd;//file descriptor 
sprintf(MAC_directory, "%s/%s", user_directory, label); 
printf("Making directory- %s\n",MAC directory); 
err= create directory(MAC_directory,dac);//maked dir w/ rwx for 
owner 
if (err != NO ERROR) { -
print error("***Creation of directory failed", err); } -
//printf("***Exiting Make_MAC_Directory\n");//take out 
fd = open(MAC directory, 0 RDONLY); 
printf("*** file descriptor is %d\n", fd}; 
if (fd == -1) 
{ 
print_error("*** ERROR in open", tcb_error_code); 
else 
{ 
err= get fd access(fd, &dac, &tempmac); 
if (err !~ NO_ERROR) 
{ 




access level.da = dac; 
err= set fd_access(fd, access_level); 
if (err != NO ERROR) { -






ll-- PROCEDURE void Create mbox 
11-- PURPOSE call IMAP to makes the mbox for a 
11-- user at a particular MAC level 
11-- Pre Mac level box made 
11-- Post mbox made 
11-- Exceptions mbox already exists 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters access rna* level 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------













printf ("***Making mbox\n"); 
the err= load process(my aps path, *level, FALSE, NULL, 
- - ( &child_proc)); 
if (the_err != NO_ERROR) 
{ 
print_error("***ERROR load_process ",the_err); 
else 
{ 
the err send ipc message(child proc, 2, TRUE, 
- - DEVICE-AVAILABLE EVENT, 
NULL, 0); -
print_error("***ERROR send_ipc_message ",the_err); 
} 
//set priv(original priv); } -
/1-------------END Create mbox ----------------------------
// 
105 
II File: toolbox.h 
II Author: Richard K. Rossetti 
II Date: Sep 2000 
II Purpose: Provide a tool to set up a mailbox 
II hierarchy on the XTS-300 
#ifndef TOOLBOX H 
#define TOOLBOX-H 






#include "hrl db.h" 
typedef struct 
{ 
char label[HRL LABEL LEN+l); 
access ma level; 
}MAC_alias_list; 
11-----------------------------------------------
ll-- PROCEDURE void Get User ID 
11-- PURPOSE Gets the-username and User ID 
11-- for a mailbox 
11-- Pre Trusted process needs privilege to 
11-- "read down" to lower integrity 
11-- database 
11-- Post User name and User Id initialized 
11-- Exceptions Invalid input from the keyboard 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters char* name, short int &id 
11-- ---------------------------------------------
void Get_User_ID(char* name, short int &id); 
11----------------------------------------------------ll-- PROCEDURE void Get Mail Home 
11-- PURPOSE Get the mail home 
11-- Pre Default mail home defined 
11-- Post mail home directory defined 
11-- Exceptions Invalid input from the keyboard 
11-- string too long 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters char* home 
11-- -------------------------------------------------
void Get_Mail_Home(char* home); 
11-------------------------------------------------------ll-- PROCEDURE void Make User Directory 
11-- PURPOSE makes the-directory lhomelusername 
11-- Pre mail home defined, user defined 
11-- Post a directory is created 









canst char* home, canst char* name, 
char* directory 
void Make User Directory(const char* home, 
- canst char* name, char* directory); 
/1-------------------------------------------------------
l/-- PROCEDURE void Get MAC list 
//-- PURPOSE Gets a list of MAC labels and MAC 
/1-- label aliases 
11-- Pre user id defined 
11-- Post A list of MAC labels and alias labels 
11-- Exceptions Invalid user input 
/1-- Return MAC alias list struct 
/1-- Parameters short int-id, *num_of_entries 
/1-- ----------------------------------------------------
MAC alias list* Get MAC list(short int id, 
- - int *num_of_entries); 
/1-------------------------------------------------------
/l-- PROCEDURE void Get User MAC label 
/1-- PURPOSE Gets the-MAC label that corresponds to 
//-- the MAC level from the security map 
11-- Pre MAC level passed in 
11-- Post A label is associated with the MAC level 
11-- Exceptions label doesnt exist 
11-- Return char string 
11-- Parameters access_ma level, char* label 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------
void Get_MAC_label(access_ma* level, char* label); 
/1-------------------------------------------------------
ll-- PROCEDURE void Make MAC Directory 
/1-- PURPOSE Makes the-MAC-level directory 
/1-- /home/username/mac level 
11-- Pre Parameters defined -
11-- Post Directory created 
11-- Exceptions directory already exists 
11-- Return void 
/1-- Parameters char user directory, char label, 
!/-- access_ma* mac, char MAC_directory 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------
void Make MAC Directory(const char* user directory, 
- - canst char* label, access ma* mac, 
char* MAC_directory); -
11-------------------------------------------------------
//-- PROCEDURE : void Upgrade MAC level 
11-- PURPOSE : Upgrades the MAC level of the mailbox 
//-- Pre Mailbox made ant min max 
/1-- Post Mailbox at appropriate MAC level 










access ma level, 
cnst char* MAC_directory. 
//void Upgrade MAC level(access ma* level, 
II - - const char* MAC dirirectory); 
II -
11-------------------------------------------------------
/l-- PROCEDURE : void Change owner 
//-- PURPOSE : Changes owner of mailbox to username 
11-- Pre Mailbox owned by admin 
11-- Post Mailbox owned by user rwx ---
//-- Exceptions none 
11-- Return void 
11-- Parameters char name, char user directory, 
11-- char mailbox_name, char MAC_directory. 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------
11 
//void Change owner(const char* name, const char* user_directory, 
II - const char* MAC_directory); 
II 
ll-------------------------------------------------------
11-- PROCEDURE : void Create mbox 
11-- PURPOSE : call IMAP to makes the mbox for a 
11-- user at a particular MAC level 
11-- Pre Mac level box made 
11-- Post mbox made 
/1-- Exceptions mbox already exists 
11-- Return void 
/1-- Parameters access ma* level 
11-- ----------------------------------------------------
void Create mbox(access ma* level); 
#endif 
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